In the Matter of

MDMA SCHEDULING

Docket No. 84-48

RESPONSE OF DRS. GRINSPOON, GREER, ET. AL.,
TO THE GOVERNMENT'S EXCEPTIONS TO THE OPINION
OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE

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Dated: June 27, 1986
Introduction

The Exceptions* filed by the DEA staff ignore the overriding issue in this case and add little or nothing new to arguments that were presented and rejected by the Administrative Law Judge.** In view of the fact that the DEA staff repeats as "Exceptions" to the Judge's ruling, arguments that they previously made to the ALJ, participants Drs. Grinspoon, Greer, et. al., will respond briefly to the way the DEA staff has posed the issue in its Exceptions and attach as appendixes to this Response the specific arguments set out in their Brief that show why the DEA staff's position is indefensible.

I. Preliminary Observations
   A. Medical Research

This case is fundamentally about medical research on a drug that cannot be patented -- research which the DEA's own medical expert testified was critically important to make significant advances in the psycho-therapeutic field.


** The DEA staff's Exceptions do add a highly prejudicial and improper attack on the integrity of the Administrative Law Judge. That issue is addressed in a separate Motion to Strike, submitted with this Response.
The evidence is wholly and totally clear on two points supported by expert testing submitted both by Drs. Grinspoon, Greer, et. al., and by the DEA staff:

- Medical research on MDMA's therapeutic potential is very important and significant;
- Placing MDMA in Schedule I will create overwhelming obstacles to that research.

The evidence on these two points in the record is summarized in Appendix A to this response. The DEA staff's Exceptions never acknowledge those critical issues. If these issues did not exist, this case would never have materialized. We urgently request the Administrator to read Appendix A to this Response.

It is the legitimate, recognized importance of medical research into MDMA's therapeutic utility that gives the present proceeding its significance. The record in this case demonstrates that placing a drug in Schedule I under the Controlled Substances Act ("CSA") creates very substantial disincentives and obstacles to research. When the drug in question cannot be patented -- such as is the case with MDMA -- those obstacles loom even larger. If a drug legitimately meets the requirements for placement in Schedule I -- high potential for abuse, no accepted medical use, no accepted safety for use under medical supervision -- important countervailing social policies may justify the obstacles and disincentives to research that are created.

But, if a drug such as MDMA does not meet the requirements established by the Controlled Substances Act
for placement in Schedule I and is erroneously placed in Schedule I, then society will pay a terrible and unnecessary price. Research that could lead to significant medical advances in the field of psychotherapy will be stymied and stifled wholly unnecessarily -- for no countervailing social gain.

Regrettably, that would be the consequence if the position urged by Agency counsel were adopted in this case. We urge the Administrator not to follow that path. We urge the Administrator to recognize that the overwhelming evidence in this case demonstrates that, while MDMA does have a potential for abuse and should be controlled under the Controlled Substances Act, it does not have a high potential for abuse and should not be placed in Schedule I. We submit that the Administrator must address the medical research issue, and not follow the head-in-the-sand approach of the DEA staff. Improperly scheduling MDMA in Schedule I would be tragic, and it is the duty and obligation of the Administrator to consider these facts and assume that the right balance is being struck between medical research interests and law enforcement needs.

B. DEA Integrity and Credibility

We respectfully submit that this case significantly tests the integrity of the DEA itself. The decision to move the DEA under the FBI was an important effort to upgrade the professionalism and credibility of the DEA. Administrator Lawn and his predecessor have made significant
strides in that direction. Administrator Lawn has sought to confront all aspects of the drug problem in the United States and has recognized that law enforcement alone -- while critically important and necessary -- will never be the complete answer. He has called urgently for public education efforts and for greater public support and understanding about the need to reduce drug abuse in the United States and about the need to educate and convince the public about the dangers of drug abuse.

If DEA is to succeed on the terms stated by Administrator Lawn, one of the key elements will be DEA's credibility: First, its credibility that it is telling the truth about the dangers of specific drugs (no small issue when dealing with young populations skeptical of authority); and second, its credibility in enlisting relevant opinion leaders to give the dangers of drug abuse the priority attention that the DEA presumably believes that it deserves.

The DEA simply cannot achieve that credibility if it is not prepared to conduct itself with integrity, honesty, and responsibility in dealing with the types of issues raised in this proceeding. The DEA staff has reacted with knee-jerk hostility to what are serious and real medical research issues. Moreover, their position that the evidence in this record warrants a finding that MDMA has a "high" potential for abuse is -- frankly -- preposterous. The evidence doesn't exist. Indeed, the DEA staff virtually concedes that fact by its emphasis on the fact that "trends
in drug abuse may shift dramatically." Exceptions, at 26. The reality behind that statement is that this record reflects a low level of abuse of MDMA.*** Nonetheless, the DEA staff is determined to place MDMA in Schedule I, come hell or high water, and it isn't going to let the facts, law, or even common courtesy to the Administrative Law Judge stand in its way.

Placing MDMA in Schedule III gives the DEA every law enforcement tool it needs to combat street use and recreational use of MDMA. The staff is perfectly aware that there are many drugs listed in Schedules II through V that have not been approved for marketing by the FDA. There is no administrative problem with doing this, and there is nothing unusual. What placing MDMA Schedule III will do is to allow university-based scientists to conduct controlled clinical research on MDMA's psycho-therapeutic potential while at the same time preserving the legitimate law enforcement interests of the DEA.

In the balance of this memorandum, participants Grinspoon, Greer, et. al., will address the specific points raised in the DEA staff's Exceptions.

***Presumably, the avalanche of publicity about MDMA triggered some increase in use in mid-1985. But every shred of evidence in the record suggests that use will fall back off. But whatever the impact of last spring's publicity, it is not in the record and has not been documented by the staff.
But, Drs. Grinspoon, Greer, et al., urge -- indeed, plead with -- the Administrator to rise above the petty, near-sighted perspective of the "old" DEA and continue his efforts to raise the credibility of the agency by acting on the basis of the evidence in the record, by taking seriously the concerns of serious medical researchers and by adopting a course of action that accommodates the concerns of research at the same time that it preserves fully the needs of law enforcement.

II. MDMA Does Not Have a High Potential For Abuse.

In our view, the critical issue in this case is the Administrative Law Judge's determination that MDMA does not have a high potential for abuse. We submit that the DEA staff's Exceptions provide no basis for departing from the carefully reasoned conclusions of the ALJ.

A. Burden of Proof Rests on the DEA Staff.

In their exceptions, agency staff never once point out that it is the agency that has the burden of proof in establishing that the criteria for placing MDMA in Schedule I have been met. Specifically, 21 C.F.R § 1316.56 provides that, "the proponents of the issuance . . . of any rule shall have the burden of proof." Agency staff has proposed the issuance of a rule placing MDMA in Schedule I. Therefore, it is the agency that has the burden of proof to establish that each of the three criteria for placing a substance in Schedule I has been met. The simple fact is that
the agency has not met that burden of proof with respect to proving that MDMA has a high potential for abuse.

B. DEA Staff Has Identified No Basis for Overturning the Administrative Law Judge's Determination that the Evidence in the Record Supports a Finding that MDMA Has Less Than a High Potential for Abuse

It is somewhat difficult to follow the DEA staff's exceptions to the Administrative Law Judge's finding with respect to potential for abuse. The text of the DEA staff's Exceptions at pages 21-29 wanders from point to point without explaining the conclusions to be drawn from the somewhat disconnected observations it makes. As we understand it, the DEA staff's arguments in summary are as follows:

The staff points out that one of the factors to be considered in determining the potential for abuse is the similarity a new drug has to a drug that is already scheduled. Exceptions, pp. 21-22. The staff then cites the ALJ's findings that MDMA has some similarities to MDA (while ignoring the Judge's findings about dissimilarities). Exceptions, pp. 22-23. The Agency then acknowledges that the record is uncontradicted that there are "qualitative differences in humans between MDA and MDMA", but argues that this uncontradicted evidence should be ignored because there have not yet been controlled scientific studies to support this proposition. Exceptions, pp. 23-24. The Agency then apparently argues that any evidence of actual abuse of MDMA -- no matter how small or trivial -- "reinforces" a finding that MDMA has a high potential for abuse. Exceptions, p. 25.
Apparently recognizing that the evidence in the record in fact indicates a continuous pattern for some twelve years of a quite low level of abuse of MDMA, the Agency speculates about a possible "shift" in the trends of drug abuse. Exceptions, p. 26. The staff's speculation about such a shift rests on a single isolated piece of testimony -- namely that there was an increase in seizures of MDMA between July 1, 1985 and early October, 1985 in Texas. Id. DEA staff then points to two other factors identified by the Congress as important in defining potential for abuse -- namely the extent to which there is evidence (1) of individuals taking the drug in amounts sufficient to create a hazard to their health; and (2) of individuals taking the drug on their own initiative.

Again without addressing the critical question of relative abuse potential, the DEA notes that some individuals seek treatment for abuse of MDMA, notes that a few mentions of MDMA have appeared in the DAWN data, and two overdose deaths have been associated with MDMA (without noting that the ALJ found the evidence insufficient to show a causal relationship). Exceptions, at 26. The DEA staff then criticizes the ALJ's conclusion that there is a large margin of safety in the use of MDMA. Exceptions, pp. 27-28.

With all due respect, these isolated observations do not even remotely form an argument that MDMA has a high potential for abuse; do not accurately reflect either the Administrative Law Judge's rulings or the state of the
and either misunderstand or misstate the legal effect and meaning of the Congressional history that the DEA staff cites.

Before analyzing each of the DEA's arguments, it is important to recognize that the DEA has never articulated any rational set of criteria for distinguishing a "high potential for abuse" from the lesser potential for abuse required for Schedules II-V. In the absence of such an articulation, the Agency cannot make a rational reasoned decision. Drs. Grinspoon, Greer, et al., have carefully analyzed the legislative history of the CSA and have identified substantial guidance about the nature of the potential for abuse appropriate for the different Schedules. See Appendix B. The Administrator must do what the staff has never done -- articulate criteria for distinguishing relative degrees of potential for abuse. The issue is not whether MDMA has any potential for abuse. Everybody agrees that it has some potential. The issue is whether MDMA has a high potential. Yet, as will appear below, the staff simply never addresses this issue. In effect, the DEA staff equates any potential for abuse with a high potential for abuse. That is irrational and certainly not in accord with the CSA.

Let us now consider each of the staff's arguments in turn.

The DEA correctly points out that the Congress identified as one of a number of factors in assessing a
drug's potential for abuse the extent to which the new drug under consideration was "so related in [its action] to an existing scheduled drug that it was likely that the drug will have the same potentiality for abuse. The DEA then goes on to argue that there is evidence that has some similarities to MDA, a Schedule I substance.

But no one disputes that there are some similarities between MDA and MDMA. Drs. Grinspoon, Greer et al. did not and do not dispute this fact. The Administrative Law Judge does not dispute the fact. Indeed, as the DEA staff's exceptions accurately point out, the Administrative Law Judge specifically found that there were some similarities. But the problem the DEA staff refuses to acknowledge is that there are also very important dissimilarities. For example, in one of the scientific animal tests of which the DEA agency staff is so fond, trained rats identified MDA as both amphetamine-like and hallucinogenic, while MDMA was only recognized by the trained animals as being amphetamine-like and not hallucinogenic.

The Administrative Law Judge's findings very meticulously and carefully identified both the chemical similarities between MDA and MDMA and the pharmacological similarities. But the Judge also noted the chemical differences and pharmacological differences. Finally, the Judge noted that MDMA also has chemical and pharmacological similarities to other drugs that are not scheduled and which apparently do not have a significant abuse potential, de-
spite similar chemical and pharmacological properties. Thus, the Judge reached the only reasonable, rational conclusion that one can on the basis of the current record. That conclusion is that the evidence on chemical structure and the evidence on pharmacological activity provided by animal studies do not provide an adequate independent basis in the case of MDMA for reaching a conclusion about MDMA's relative potential for liability. Indeed, the National Institute on Drug Abuse in reviewing this data specifically concluded that it did not establish abuse potential.

Having reviewed the chemical and pharmacological issues, the Administrative Law Judge then turned to the wealth of evidence in the record with respect to the actual effects of MDMA in humans. The DEA staff would apparently have the Administrator simply refuse to consider this evidence. Such an act would be extraordinary, irresponsible and legally indefensible. There is a wealth of direct evidence in the record on the effect of MDMA in humans. That is the precise issue -- the potential of abuse of MDMA in humans -- that the Administrator must confront. Moreover, the evidence in the record with respect to MDMA's effects in humans is wholly consistent and uncontradicted. Based on direct reports from trained psychiatrists who have themselves taken MDMA and from their professional observations of patients who have taken MDMA, it is absolutely uncontradicted that MDMA is not hallucinogenic in humans. The Administrative Law Judge so found. Even in the face of
overwhelming, uncontradicted evidence, including both scientific animal tests and direct human experience in the record, agency staff buries its head and refuses to acknowledge that simple fact. Such a posture is not argument; it is not intelligent; it is not responsible.

Similarly, the Administrative Law Judge found that the uncontradicted evidence in the record is that there are qualitative differences in humans in the effects produced by MDA and MDMA. That finding is unassailable. Every piece of testimony about human experience with the two drugs is to that effect. And the agency itself filed its Exhibit B-25, a highly scientific article authored by scientists at the NIH which specifically reached the conclusion that MDA was "a well studied hallucinogenic which produces a qualitatively different intoxication than MDMA." How can the Agency dispute the Administrative Law Judge's finding on this score?

In sum, the DEA staff's exceptions do not remotely undercut the ALJ's conclusions that MDMA's chemical structure, pharmacologic properties, and animal test data do not provide support for a conclusion that MDMA has a high potential for abuse. In Appendix C, we set out a detailed analysis of the evidence in the record to demonstrate that the ALJ's findings are correct.

The DEA Staff then takes the position that evidence of any abuse demonstrates a "high" potential for abuse. Yet, the Administrative Law Judge made meticulous
findings of fact (findings 59-85) that demonstrate that the level of abuse of MDMA over the past 12 years has been low to, at most, moderate. Those findings are firmly rooted in the record. Agency staff has wholly failed to articulate how one can rationally argue that a low level of actual abuse provides evidentiary support for a conclusion that a drug has a "high" potential for abuse. To the extent that the Agency must make a relative determination of how much potential a particular drug has to be abused, it must take into account the relative extent of actual abuse when such evidence exists. That is precisely what the Administrative Law Judge did. It is precisely what the DEA staff refuses to do. The Agency staff's position is simply nonsensical, when the effort is to assess relative potential for abuse.*

* Agency counsel's discussion of the Administrative Law Judge's comparison of the human therapeutic dose to the oral LD 50 determined for the rats represents mostly invectiveness and reflects very little sensitivity to the serious scientific issues involved in extrapolating the results of animal studies to humans. This part of the Agency's exceptions are not based on any testimony in the record and is scientifically incorrect. The point to be made is simple. There is evidence in the record with respect to the LD 50 for five different species (the guinea pig, the rat, the mouse, the dog, and the monkey). See Exhibit 18. That is a significant amount of data. For two species (dog, monkey) the LD 50 was with MDMA administered intravenously (directly into the vein). For three species (the guinea pig, the rat, the mouse) the MDMA was administered intraperitoneally (directly into the stomach cavity). In addition, there is an estimated LD 50 for oral administration to rats. All these data are consistent. They all point to all LD 50 for MDMA when administered orally in the range of at least 300 milligrams per kilogram. The rat appears to be the most sensitive animal to these types of chemicals. (That would suggest that the other animals would have a higher LD 50 for oral administration). In short, using the rat's LD 50 as a (Footnote continued)
The Administrative Law Judge's findings and conclusions with respect to the low to moderate potential for abuse of MDMA is not only supported by the evidence in the record, but compelled by it. In Appendix D, the evidence in the record bearing on potential for abuse is meticulously examined. We urge the Administrator to review that analysis in detail.

Applying the correct understanding of the legal requirements for determining the high potential for abuse and assessing the evidence in the current record, we submit the only conclusion the Administrative Law Judge -- or the Administrator -- can come to is that MDMA does not have a high potential for abuse. We respectfully submit that there is no evidence whatsoever in the record when viewed honestly as a whole that would provide any basis to reverse the ALJ's findings or conclusions.

III. Definition of Accepted Medical Use

The Exceptions filed by the DEA staff to the ALJ's opinion on the interpretation of the phrase "accepted medical use in treatment" are disingenuous and provide no basis

(Footnote * continued from previous page)

basis to extrapolate to an approximate human LD 50 would be conservative. With a therapeutic dose of 2 milligrams per kilogram administered to humans, the margin of 160 times the human therapeutic dose gives an enormous margin of safety. Even if humans were more sensitive than rats, the margin of safety would still be very substantial. The ALJ's analysis is far more cogent than that of the DEA lawyers.
for reaching a different conclusion than that reached by the Administrative Law Judge.

The DEA staff ignores two central legal realities in arguing that the FDA's approval of a drug for marketing determines whether it has accepted medical use. First, The DEA itself told Congress in 1970 that the determination of "accepted medical use in treatment" was "not made by any part of the federal government. It is made by the medical community as to whether or not the drug has medical use or doesn't." Hearings before the House Subcommittee on Public Health and Welfare on H.R. 18583, Part II, at 718 (1970).

Second, the D.C. Circuit ruled in the NORML case in 1977 that accepted medical use is not to be determined on the basis of whether FDA has or has not approved a drug for interstate marketing. A full discussion of the relevant legal analysis supporting the ALJ's ruling appears in Appendix D.

Agency counsel's efforts in its Exceptions to rely on the FD&C Act's definition of "new drug" is misplaced for two reasons. (1) The statutory language of the two provisions is totally different, and (2) the legislative history of the two provisions make clear that they were intended to serve different purposes and to be interpreted differently.

In addition, DEA counsel glibly asserted that "there is a vast difference between not interfering with a physician's unapproved use of drugs already approved for some use by the Food and Drug Administration, and a finding
that use of a drug not approved for any purpose lacks a currently accepted medical use." Exceptions, p. 4. That statement is simply wrong and nonsensical. Doctors currently use drugs that have been approved at one dosage level by one route of administration for a specific indication in wholly different ways -- at different dosage levels, by different routes of administration and for different indications. As a legal matter, doctors are using drugs in ways and for purposes that have not been approved whatsoever by the FDA. There is simply no legal difference whatsoever in the case of an unapproved drug. The FDA is simply not in the business of determining what is "accepted medical use in treatment." A full legal analysis supporting the ALJ's analysis is set out in Appendix F.

A. Evidence on Accepted Medical Use and Accepted Safety for Use Under Medical Supervision

The DEA staff's efforts to criticize the ALJ's findings should not be accepted by the Administrator. The fact is that the DEA staff and the FDA staff who originally prepared the recommendation that MDMA should be placed in Schedule I never even considered whether MDMA was used by practicing physicians. They operated on the assumption that if a drug did not have an NDA, then it had no medical use. The DEA counsel litigated this case on the same theory. DEA staff put only two doctors on the stand, and neither doctor testified about his knowledge of existing medical use. They testified that they would not use MDMA. Even then, one of
DEA's experts testified that MDMA was a potentially very important drug. See Appendix A. On the basis of that testimony, the DEA can hardly claim they have met their burden to prove MDMA does not have an accepted medical use. The overwhelming evidence on these points in the record is discussed in the ALJ's opinion and at pp. 83-89 and pp. 92-93 of our Brief in this proceeding.

B. Two Final Observations

First, the controversy surrounding whether MDMA has an accepted medical use underlines and underscores the desperate need for more research. As a legal matter, since MDMA does not have a high potential for abuse, it cannot properly be placed in Schedule I. See Decision of the ALJ on Preliminary Issue, filed June __, 1985. The Administrator thus does not need to reach the issue of whether MDMA has an accepted medical use. Whether it does or not, MDMA belongs in Schedule III.

Second, placing MDMA in Schedule III meets all the needs for control by the DEA of illicit use. See Appendix F. There are presently many substances (precursors, substances scheduled under International Convention) in Schedules II through IV that do not have an FDA-approved
NDA. This course of action is practical, and it meets the needs of both medical research and the DEA. We urge the Administrator to place MDMA in Schedule III.

Respectfully submitted,

[Signature]

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on June 27, 1986, a copy of the foregoing Response of Drs. Grinspoon and Greer, et al, to the Government's Exceptions to the Opinion of the Administrative Law Judge, Motion to Strike Portions of the Exceptions Filed by DEA Staff, and Request for Opportunity for Oral Presentation to the Administrator, on Behalf of Drs. Greer and Grinspoon, Professors Bakalar and Roberts was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following:

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APPENDICES

A MDMA's Medical Potential and Effect of Schedule I on Research

B Criteria for Determining Relative Abuse Potential

C Chemical Structure, Pharmacology and Animal Data Do Not Show "High" Potential for Abuse

D Evidence on Human Effects Demonstrates that MDMA Does Not Have High Potential for Abuse

E Proper Definition of Accepted Medical Use.

F FDA Does Not Define Accepted Medical Use

G Restrictions on MDMA in Schedule III
I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

- "It [MDMA] is an interesting compound, one of potentially great importance to the field that ought to be . . . investigated within a research framework."

- "One of the important developments in the field [of psychotherapy] has been the moving together of psychopharmacology and psychotherapy and their combined use to relieve psychiatric problems. A drug which could particularly enhance the psychotherapeutic process is . . . at the next stage in that whole development. . . . it [MDMA] represents a drug which could potentially have an impact on the psychotherapeutic process itself."

- "This drug [MDMA] since it focuses direction [on the combined effect of a drug and psychotherapy] . . . is a useful one because it really points the field where it ought to be headed."

- "MDMA is an agent that offers the possibility of moving us into an understanding of some disturbance[s] in interpersonal processes, which is an important aspect of psychiatric disorder, but one which we have really not addressed specifically with our drug treatment. This has to do with some of the anecdotal reports of the effect of MDMA on what I would call attachment behav-
ior, the degree to which two people form some kind of a bonding between them . . . is the aspect of [MDMA] that may have psychotherapeutic importance."

-- DEA witness Dr. John Docherty, former chief of Psychosocial Treatments Research Branch at National Institute of Mental Health. Tr. 7, at 130, 131.

"It should be noted that the Committee held extensive discussions concerning the reported therapeutic usefulness of MDMA. While the Committee found the reports intriguing, it was felt that the studies lack the appropriate methodological design necessary to ascertain the reliability of the observations. There was, however, sufficient interest expressed to recommend that investigations be encouraged to follow-up these preliminary findings. To this end, the Committee urges nations to use the provisions of Article VII of the Convention on Psychotropic Substances to facilitate research on this interesting substance."


DEA witnesses and international medical committees of the World Health Organization do not lightly -- or frequently -- issue strong public declarations of the need for medical research into the therapeutic utility of a compound. The need for research on MDMA has been stated even more

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1 In citing the transcripts in this proceeding and the documentary exhibits, this Brief will use the same citation form established by Agency counsel in their Brief.
strongly in this proceeding in the sworn testimony of a
dozen other psychiatrists, including the Deputy Editor of
the American Journal of Psychiatry (the official journal of
the American Psychiatric Association and the leading psychi-
atriic journal in the United States if not in the world), two
psychiatrists on the faculty of the Harvard Medical School,
a Philadelphia psychiatrist expert in drug abuse, a Massa-
chusetts psychiatrist with extensive experience using MDMA
in his private practice, four New Mexico psychiatrists in-
cluding a faculty member at the University of New Mexico
School of Medicine, and three California psychiatrists in-
cluding the state-wide psychiatric consultant to the Cali-
ifornia Department of Rehabilitation.

II. ADVERSE EFFECTS ON RESEARCH OF
PLACEMENT IN SCHEDULE I

The record in this case leaves no doubt whatsoever
that the placement of a drug in Schedule I in fact strongly
discourages medical research on that drug.

First, placing a drug in Schedule I creates
bureaucratic delays in getting approval from the government
to proceed with such research as well as added adminis-
trative burdens in carrying it out. A research project on a
Schedule I drug must be affirmatively approved by the FDA
before it can commence. 21 C.F.R. § 1301.42(a)-(c); Tr. 8,
at 82. For research with drugs in other Schedules, the
researcher must submit an IND application to the FDA but may
proceed with the research in the event that the FDA does not
disapprove his application within 30 days. Tr. 8, at 65-66.
In addition, a researcher who wants to do research on a drug in Schedule I must secure a special registration from the DEA and must submit a research protocol that meets specifications set by the DEA. 21 C.F.R. §§ 1301.22(a)(8), 1301.33, 1301.42. Testimony in this case establishes that two researchers who had applied to the DEA two to three months prior to the hearings in this case for registrations to do Schedule I research on MDMA had still not received approval from the DEA at the time of the hearings. Tr. 8, at 94. Moreover, the official in charge of processing their applications testified that there was no time limit that requires the DEA to act on an application within any period of time. The official testified that such an application could pend at the DEA indefinitely or, in the words of the official, "ad infinitum." Tr. 8, at 94.

Further, researchers on Schedule I drugs are subject to additional reporting and security procedures, beyond those imposed on research on Schedule II through V drugs. As the clinical research director for Hoffmann-LaRoche testified, even though these matters are "only a question of good work, time and money," at some point these increased requirements become "so burdensome that some clinicians prefer to deal with different drugs rather than evaluate Schedule I" drugs. Tr. 8, at 104. If these burdens have such an effect on well-financed drug company researchers, imagine the impact on academic researchers in the case of MDMA, which cannot be patented.
Second, it is clear from the record in this case that, wholly apart from the additional requirements imposed by the Government for carrying out research on Schedule I drugs, the placement of a drug in Schedule I has strongly adverse effects outside the government. The criteria for placing a drug in Schedule I are so negative (i.e., high potential for abuse, no accepted medical use and no accepted safety even under medical supervision) that they raise grave concern on the part of both researchers and volunteers in clinical experiments about even being associated with such a drug. In addition, there is a guilt-by-association effect on a drug that is placed in a Schedule that includes heroin and LSD.

In this connection, it is interesting to note that in 1970 when the Administration originally proposed the legislation that became the Controlled Substances Act, it recognized that Schedule I would carry a highly adverse reputation. The Administration felt that this reputation would be so strong that it proposed that the DEA should not have the authority to move a drug out of Schedule I to any schedule other than Schedule II:

Mr. Rogers. So why should we put a prohibition in the law saying you can't remove I to III and IV?

Mr. Sonnenreich. Because these specific drugs in Schedule I have certain emotionalism around them. We felt that if Congress saw fit to remove those, that would be one thing, but it should not be in the hands of any administrative official to do it automatically.

The combined effect on research of the added bureaucratic requirements, the negative perception of the criteria associated with Schedule I, and the effect of being grouped with heroin and LSD is devastating. The clinical research director of Hoffmann-LaRoche testified that, in her opinion, disclosure on patient consent forms of the criteria for Schedule I drugs and of the identity of other Schedule I substances would strongly discourage both investigators and volunteers from participating in clinical studies. Tr. 8, at 102. It was her strongly held view that, in light of these difficulties, Hoffmann-LaRoche would not conduct research on a drug that was placed in Schedule I unless it was truly an extraordinary break-through life-saving drug. Tr. 8, at 110. The Hoffmann-LaRoche clinical research director further testified that she did not believe her attitude was in any way unique among the pharmaceutical companies. Tr. 8, at 122.

Similarly, academic researchers interested in researching Schedule I substances find it much more difficult to obtain approvals for research from institutional review boards given the extremely negative perception of Schedule I substances. Lipton, Tr. 7, at 151, 163-64. For example, one researcher experienced in doing research with Schedule I drugs recently expressed his frustrations with the obstacles placed in the way of doing research on such
drugs: "Based on [my experience] I would say that an investigator might look forward to a delay of a year or longer in getting his work with a Schedule I drug under way." GG-49.

Finally, the record graphically reflects the actual, empirically confirmed results of these effects. Dr. Grinspoon, an international authority in this area and a well-respected psychiatrist on the faculty of the Harvard Medical School, testified that he was familiar with the literature in the field of Schedule I drugs. His testimony and writing reflect the fact that in the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s, extensive research was taking place on many Schedule I drugs in the area of psychiatry research. GG-16; Tr. 6, at 65. He testified that his review of the literature at the present time indicates that virtually no research is currently being carried out. Tr. 6, at 104-5.

Confirming Dr. Grinspoon's testimony, the Food and Drug Administration reported that it had received and approved in the last five years precisely one application to carry out research on Schedule I drugs in the area of psychotherapy. GG-57.

Finally, there is direct testimony in the record of two different research projects on MDMA that were adversely affected by the emergency placement of MDMA into Schedule I. Dr. Robert Lynch, statewide psychiatrist consultant to the California Department of Rehabilitation, testified that he was interested in carrying out a research project on MDMA involving clients of the California Depart-
ment of Rehabilitation. Dr. Lynch testified that he had begun steps to carry out such a research project, including obtaining approval from the director of the department and writing for further information to the Food and Drug Administration. Tr. 2, at 100. But, Dr. Lynch testified that the placement of MDMA in Schedule I had caused him to re-think whether he could carry the research project out and that its future was in doubt. Tr. 2, at 100, 103-4.

Dr. Grinspoon testified that a group of researchers at Harvard Medical School had been planning a research project on MDMA. He testified that the emergency placement of MDMA in Schedule I had cast a "pall" over the project and that he was now uncertain whether that project would proceed. Tr. 6, at 90-91.

In sum, if MDMA is to be placed permanently in Schedule I, that decision must be made with a full understanding of its consequences. Those consequences will simply and undeniably be that research into MDMA's therapeutic potential will be discouraged, stifled, and made infinitely more difficult than if it were in a lower schedule. If MDMA -- evaluated objectively and fairly -- does not meet the requirements for placement on Schedule I, it would be socially counterproductive -- indeed tragic -- to discourage research into what a number of leading academic and clinical psychiatrists testified might be a drug that represents an entire new class of valuable psychotherapeutic agents.
III. UNDER CSA'S SCHEDULING CRITERIA, MDMA SHOULD BE PLACED IN SCHEDULE III, NOT IN SCHEDULE I.

A. Potential for Abuse

In order to place a substance in a Schedule under the CSA, a finding must be made that the substance has a "potential for abuse." Then the substance's relative potential for abuse must be determined. Substances with a "high" potential for abuse are to be placed in either Schedule I or II. Those with less than a "high" potential for abuse are to be placed in Schedules III, IV, or V. The statute itself provides no further direct guidance as to what is meant by "potential for abuse." However, the provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 811(c), and the legislative history of the Controlled Substances Act do provide important additional guidance.

1. Eight Factors To Be Considered

The provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 811(c) mandate that the DEA take into account eight specified factors in making "any finding" in determining the Schedule in which to place a drug. These eight factors are as follows:

(1) Its actual or relative potential for abuse.

(2) Scientific evidence of its pharmacological effect, if known.

(3) The state of current scientific knowledge regarding the substance.
(4) **Its history and current pattern of abuse.**

(5) **The scope, duration, and significance of abuse.**

(6) **What, if any, risk there is to the public health.**

(7) **Its psychic or physiological dependence liability.**

(8) **Whether the substance is an immediate precursor of a controlled substance.**

21 U.S.C. § 811(c) (emphasis added).

Thus, the DEA must take into account all of the above factors in making a determination with respect to potential for abuse and relative potential for abuse. The most important lesson that 21 U.S.C. § 811(c) teaches with respect to the current proceeding is that the DEA is not free to make a determination concerning a drug's relative potential for abuse without considering the history and current pattern of abuse of that drug relative to experience with other controlled drugs; the scope, duration, and significance of abuse of a particular drug relative to that of other drugs; the risk to the public health posed by abuse of a particular drug relative to that of other drugs; and a drug's psychic or physiological dependence liability relative to that of other Scheduled drugs.

In short, we submit that the provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 811(c) mean that the DEA may not make a determination of relative potential for abuse based exclusively on theoretical similarities between drugs based on chemical
structure or pharmacological effects. Rather, the DEA is mandated by the statute to take into account the actual experience "on the streets" with the drug when making a determination of its relative potential for abuse. As we shall see, the Act's legislative history confirms this interpretation. See infra pp. 30 to 33.

2. Legislative History on "Potential for Abuse"

The legislative history of the CSA provides very important guidance in defining the term "potential for abuse." In order to discuss the legislative history of the Controlled Substances Act, it is necessary to describe briefly the evolution of the Act. The Administration originally submitted a bill that was introduced in both the House and the Senate. The Senate passed S. 3246, The Controlled Dangerous Substances Act of 1969, on January 28, 1970. 116 Cong. Rec. S1671 (1970). The Senate-passed bill was essentially the Administration bill.

The House Subcommittee on Public Health and Welfare of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce then held eleven days of hearings in February and March, 1970. Subsequently, the House Subcommittee drafted a clean bill amending in many important particulars both the Administration and Senate versions and introduced the Subcommittee's "clean" bill as Titles I and II of H.R. 18583. 116 Cong. Rec. H332987 (September 23, 1970). It was the Subcommittee's version of the bill that was ultimately enacted into the Controlled Substances Act of 1970.
Therefore, the testimony before the House Subcommittee on Public Health and Welfare, the report of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H.R. 18583, and the floor debates of the House and Senate are the critical references in determining the intent of Congress in enacting various provisions of the CSA.

a. House Committee Report

With respect to the definition of the term "potential for abuse," the House report provides some guidance on defining that term. Specifically, the House report refers to the definition that existed in regulations promulgated under the sections of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act which were the predecessor statutes to the Controlled Substances Act.2

2 These regulations, as quoted by the House Report, provided as follows: The Director may determine that a substance has potential for abuse because of its depressant or stimulant effect on the central nervous system or its hallucinogenic effect if:

(1) There is evidence that individuals are taking the drug or drugs containing such a substance in amounts sufficient to create a hazard to their health or to the safety of other individuals or of the community; or

(2) There is significant diversion of the drug or drugs containing such a substance from legitimate drug channels; or

(3) Individuals are taking the drug or drugs containing such a substance on their own initiative rather than on the basis of medical advice from a practitioner licensed by law to administer such drugs in the course of his professional practice; or

(Footnote continued)
Most significantly, however, the House report then goes on to make the following critically important observations:

(1) The Committee made clear that it "did not intend that potential for abuse be determined on the basis of 'isolated or occasional non-therapeutic purposes.' The Committee felt that there must exist 'a substantial potential for the occurrence of significant diversions from legitimate channels, significant use by individuals contrary to professional advice, or substantial capability of creating hazards to the health of the user or the safety of the community' ..." House Report, at 35 (emphasis added). The Committee also noted, of course, that it did not intend the agency "to wait until a number of lives have been destroyed or substantial problems have already arisen before designating a drug as subject to controls of the bill." Id.

(Footnote 2 continued from previous page)

(4) The drug or drugs containing such a substance are new drugs so related in their action to a drug or drugs already listed as having a potential for abuse to make it likely that the drug will have the same potentiality for abuse as such drugs, thus making it reasonable to assume that there may be significant diversions from legitimate channels, significant use contrary to or without medical advice, or that it has a substantial capability of creating hazards to the health of the user or to the safety of the community.

(2) The Committee went further in explaining what it meant by declaring that "a substantial potential" had to exist for significant diversion or significant use. The Committee declared that:

the term "substantial" means more than a mere scintilla of isolated abuse, but less than a preponderance. Therefore, documentation that, say, several hundred thousand dosage units of a drug have been diverted would be 'substantial' evidence of abuse despite the fact that tens of millions of dosage units of that drug are legitimately used in the same time period.

House Report, at 35.

(3) The Committee also observed that "misuse of a drug in suicides and attempted suicides, as well as injuries resulting from unsupervised use, are regarded as indicative of a drug's potential for abuse."

House Report, at 35.

The single most important fact to be noted about these observations by the House Committee is that they apply to the question of whether any potential for abuse has been established sufficient to warrant control under the Controlled Substances Act. In other words, the above excerpts from the House Committee Report are seeking to provide guidance on the minimum potential for abuse that must be identified before a substance is included even in the lowest schedule of the Act, i.e., Schedule V. In the excerpts quoted above, the Committee Report was attempting to define the level of abuse that would warrant any control whatsoever of a drug. If a drug did not attain the level of potential
of abuse described in the House Report, the drug would then go uncontrolled.

Thus, in order for a drug to be controlled even at the Schedule V level, the Committee intended that there be evidence that at least "several hundred thousand dosage units" of a drug had been diverted, or that there be other evidence establishing "a substantial potential" for either "significant diversion," "significant use by individuals," or "substantial capability of creating hazards to the health of the user or the safety of the community." Only on the basis of this evidence would any control at all -- i.e., Schedule V -- be warranted.

It follows that, in order to move a substance into Schedule IV, the government would have to show a more substantial level of abuse than described by the Committee as the minimum necessary for any control at all. In order to move a substance to Schedule III, the Agency would have to show further evidence of an even higher potential for abuse. And finally, in order to move a substance into either Schedule I or II -- as having a "high" potential for abuse -- the government would have to make a showing three orders of magnitude above the level of abuse potential described in the House Committee's report.

b. Evolution of Five Schedules

Further light is shed on congressional intent with respect to the relative levels of "potential for abuse" required to place drugs into the different Schedules by
following the evolution of the five Schedules which now appear in 21 U.S.C. § 812(b). The bill originally submitted by the Administration and the bill that was originally passed by the Senate in January, 1970 contained only four schedules. The four schedules in the Senate bill, S. 3246, are set out in the margin. The House Committee rewrite, however, creates five schedules for the first time, 116 Cong. Rec. H33607 (September 24, 1970).

Schedules I and II in the Senate bill are essentially the same as Schedules I and II established by the

| Schedule I -- | (1) a high potential for abuse; (2) no accepted medical use in the United States; (3) a lack of accepted safety for use under medical supervision. |
| Schedule II -- | (1) a high potential for abuse; (2) currently accepted medical use in the United States or currently accepted medical use with severe restrictions; (3) abuse may lead to severe psychic or physical dependence. |
| Schedule III -- | (1) a potential for abuse less than the substances listed in Schedules I and II; (2) well documented and approved medical use in the United States; (3) abuse may lead to moderate or low physical dependence or high psychological dependence. |
| Schedule IV -- | (1) a low potential for abuse relative to the substances listed in Schedule III; (2) currently accepted medical use in the United States; (3) limited physical dependence and/or psychological dependence liability relative to the substances listed in Schedule III. |

House bill. However, Schedule III in the Senate bill was divided by the House Committee into two schedules -- namely, Schedule III and Schedule IV. It is the division of Schedule III as it existed in the original Administration version and in the Senate bill into two separate schedules in the House bill that sheds light on the nature of the potential for abuse necessary to place substances in various schedules.

The original Administration bill and the Senate bill placed in their Schedule III all of the following drugs: all amphetamines; methamphetamine; barbiturates; combination compounds containing sufficiently high levels of narcotics that the compounds could be highly addictive; minor tranquilizers; and mild sleeping preparations.

When the Senate bill went over to the House, the House Subcommittee on Public Health and Welfare heard bitter criticism of the breadth of the Schedule III created by the Senate bill and the Administration bill. For example, Dr. Henry Brill of the AMA Committee on Alcoholism and Drug Dependence testified as follows:

In Schedule III of both S. 3246 [the Senate bill] and H.R. 17343 [the Administration bill], however, there is a confusing admixture of drugs of very different degrees of hazard: for example, methamphetamine and chloral hydrate. . . . We believe that the drugs now grouped under Schedule III should be divided into at least two distinct classifications with the more hazardous and less useful substances clearly separated from the less hazardous and more useful ones, so as to permit control techniques appropriate to each.

House Hearings, at 231-32.
Professor Neil Chayet, a lawyer then serving on an advisory committee to the National Institute of Mental Health and representing a group of scientists, physicians and legal experts, testified:

It is difficult to fathom how drugs such as chlo-ral hydrate, chlordiazepoxide (Librium) and diaze-epam (Valium) can be classed in the same Schedule with methamphetamines, one of the most abused and deadly of substances.

House Hearings, at 313.

A major pharmaceutical house specifically sug-gested the course that the House Subcommittee ultimately adopted in the following words:

The purpose of this supplemental statement is to review the evidence introduced before this commit-tee. We believe that this evidence, particularly the cogent testimony of medical and scientific witnesses, clearly establishes the need to revise the four schedules in the Proposed Administration Bill.

Our suggestion is that a new schedule be estab-lished and inserted between the present Schedules III and IV of the Drug Abuse Legislation H.R. 13743. This new schedule would be designed to insure that drugs of low abuse potential, such as the minor tranquilizers and long-acting barbi-turates, are not classified together with amphet-amines and short-acting barbiturates which raise far more severe drug-abuse problems.

House Hearings, at 776.

In addition to these criticisms of the breadth of the Schedule III classification in the Senate Bill and in the Administration Bill, the House Subcommittee also re-ceived substantial evidence of the nature and extent of the drug abuse problems posed by amphetamines, methamphetamines, and barbiturates. Congressman Pepper, as Chairman of the

Indeed, Representative Pepper even introduced into the record the hearings that his Select Committee had held on "Crime in America -- Why 8 Billion Amphetamines?" House Hearings, at 595.

In other testimony, Dr. Stanley Yolles, then Director of the National Institute of Mental Health, testified that:

more than 8 billion amphetamine tablets are manufactured yearly, and . . . . a significant percentage are diverted to illicit channels . . .
Swallowing stimulants in increasing amounts is becoming more widespread . . .

House Hearings, at 177.

In addition, Dr. Yolles testified about the widespread extent of abuse of barbiturates. He testified that

"... barbiturates are the No. 1 method of committing suicide by chemical means. Suicidal or accidental deaths due to barbiturates exceed 3,000 a year in the United States. Many more are rescued from overdosages in hospitals. Some 10 billion sedative dosage units will be produced this year, enough to provide each man, woman and child with 50. At least half of this supply gets into the illicit market. . . . The trend seems to be that increased numbers of people are abusing barbiturates, with a tendency to move to larger amounts of more harmful agents."

(House Hearings, at 177-179.)
Having received this evidence -- (1) facts and figures about the extraordinary and widespread extent of abuse and concomitant dangers of amphetamines, barbiturates, and methamphetamines, and (2) expert opinion that Schedule III in the Administration and Senate bills was too broad, the House Subcommittee acted. The Subcommittee split the Schedule III in the Administration and Senate bills into two separate schedules. The House bill's new Schedule III contained amphetamines, short-acting barbiturates, methamphetamine and multiple-ingredient compounds that included sufficient levels of narcotics to be highly addicting. The House bill's new Schedule IV contained the minor tranquilizers, longer-acting barbiturates, and milder sleeping preparations. The original Schedule IV of the Senate and Administration bills became Schedule V in the House bill. The Schedules contained in the House's bill were then enacted into the Controlled Substances Act.

What this legislative history helps us to understand is that Schedule III was intended to include drugs with enormous "potential for abuse" which had been demonstrated by actual widespread abuse. Indeed, amphetamines were so notoriously and widely abused that a major effort on the floor of the House was made by Representative Pepper to move amphetamines out of Schedule III and into II. See 116 Cong. Rec. H33603 - H33609. Two primary elements are instructive about the floor debate. First, the reason that Congressman Pepper and most of his supporters advanced for
moving amphetamines from Schedule III to II was because they wanted, in the words of Rep. Pepper, "to subject the dangerous drugs to a quota system of control." 116 Cong. Rec. H33609.

Congressman Pepper did not argue that amphetamines did not meet the criteria for being placed in Schedule III. Rather, he argued that, in view of the massive diversion of amphetamines from legal manufacturers into illicit channels, it was important that Congress mandate they be subject to the quota provisions which applied to Schedule II drugs and did not apply to Schedule III drugs. Thus even those who supported moving amphetamines from Schedule III to Schedule II appeared to accept the fact that the highly abused amphetamines could, under the criteria set out for Schedule III, properly be classified as Schedule III drugs. It is also highly instructive to note that no one expressed any view that the highly abused barbiturates placed in Schedule III by the House bill were improperly classified.

It is even more important to look at the words of the Subcommittee members who drafted the House bill. Congressman Paul Rogers was the second-ranking Democrat on the Subcommittee that drafted the bill. (Subcommittee Chairman Jarman specifically noted on the House floor that Rep. Rogers "contributed in such a major manner to the development of this legislation and its presentation to the House." 116 Cong. Rec. H33303 (September 24, 1970)). Rep. Rogers responded to Rep. Pepper's proposed amendment as follows:
Mr. Rogers of Florida. That is exactly what the bill provides. If the able gentleman would permit me to explain this, we have directed that the Attorney General control these drugs [amphetamines and methamphetamine]. This is a controlled drug. It is not in Schedule II. It is in Schedule III. The reason it is in Schedule III and was put there by the Committee is that the medical and scientific people, as well as the law-enforcement people, said that that is where it should be. That is the testimony and this committee spent almost 50 sessions going into it. We have medical and scientific decisions as to where it should be. There is no department of the Government that is rougher on the abuser and that is more for law and order than the Department of Justice. Do you know what they said? They say it should not be done in this legislative way -- just dump everything in a schedule, even though the scientists and the department have determined amphetamines should be in Schedule III.


In further response to Congressman Pepper's amendment, Representative Carter, the ranking Republican member on the House Subcommittee that drafted the bill, spoke in opposition to moving amphetamines from Schedule III to II as follows:

Mr. Carter. Mr. Chairman, I want to say to the distinguished gentleman in the well that no one is more interested in controlling drugs than we. If the gentleman would look at Schedule III, he will find that 'amphetamine, its salts, optical isomers, and salts of its optical isomers' and 'methylamphetamine,' and all the drugs which the gentleman has mentioned are there.

Under the bill which we have drawn, from the time this drug is manufactured and is sold and is transported and goes to the drug store, it must be completely
controlled and accounted for. There is very little chance of diversion under this bill. We are taking care of the legislation which the gentleman wants, right here in the bill.


In sum, the legislative history plainly indicates that the "potential for abuse" that must be demonstrated in order to place a drug into Schedule III was very, very substantial. The House Subcommittee made a deliberate decision to place amphetamines and barbiturates in Schedule III based on extensive documentation of enormous abuse. Schedule III was differentiated from Schedule IV which was to contain drugs of significant but lesser potential for abuse, such as the minor tranquilizers. But Schedule III was also differentiated from Schedule I and Schedule II which, under the House Committee's bill, required the further showing of a "high" potential for abuse.

Drs. Grinspoon, Greer, et al., recognize that the DEA through administrative action has moved amphetamines and some barbiturates from Schedule III to Schedule II. The DEA's decision to exercise its authority in this respect in no way can affect the intent of the Congress as to the nature of the abuse potential appropriate for drugs in Schedule III. It is clear that the Congress intended the DEA to exercise the authority given to it to move drugs from one schedule to another when facts and circumstances so warranted. But the fact that the DEA has exercised that authority does not rewrite history and change the nature of the abuse potential that Congress contemplated when it created Schedule III.
c. Conclusions to be Drawn

Thus, from the legislative history, we do in fact gain an understanding of the continuum of "potential for abuse" reflected in the Schedules established under the Controlled Substances Act. Schedule V was to be for drugs which had "substantial potential" for a "significant diversion," a "significant use" outside of medical supervision or "a substantial capacity" to harm the health of users or the community. Such a drug should have either a demonstrated track record or the clear potential to involve the diversion or consumption of "several hundred thousand dosage units." Then Schedule IV would involve drugs as to which there was a higher potential for abuse such as the minor tranquilizers. The House Committee and the Congress recognized that there was widespread abuse of minor tranquilizers such as Valium and Librium at the time it created Schedule IV for the minor tranquilizers. See 116 Cong. Rec. S1683-89 (Jan. 28, 1970); 116 Cong. Rec. S.35516-23 (Oct. 7, 1970).

Then, Schedule III was intended to include drugs of very substantial potential for abuse including amphetamines and barbiturates. Schedules I and II were reserved for drugs of "high potential for abuse" -- which needed to be placed under production quotas. See also Conference Report, H.R. Rep. 91-1603, at 9.

Drs. Greer, Grinspoon, et al., submit that it is this continuum which the Administrative Law Judge and the
DEA must apply to determine the Schedule into which MDMA should be placed.

3. Proof of Relative Abuse Potential Required Based On Evidence of Actual Experience

It is obvious, of course, from the mere existence of varying degrees of abuse potential required by each of the various Schedules that the findings to be made by the Agency must be based on evidence of relative potential for abuse. This need to prove relative potential for abuse was appreciated from the outset. Mr. Sonnenreich specifically testified as follows:

Mr. Sonnenreich . . . and then there is the second decision that has to be made . . . as to not only that it should be controlled but which Schedule it should be controlled in. This involves decisions such as whether or not it has currently accepted medical use in the United States, whether or not in terms of relativity its relative potential for abuse is for Schedule II, for Schedule III, or Schedule IV.

House Hearings, at 141 (emphasis added).

Moreover, for drugs that are "on the street," the Agency must prove the relative potential for abuse of individual drugs based on relative levels of actual abuse.

Again this subject is illuminated by testimony of Mr. Sonnenreich before the House Subcommittee:

Mr. Sonnenreich. I would disagree with that, Congressman. No. 1 [the determination about a high potential for abuse] is clearly the street abuse problem or the abuse problem as found by agents of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. . . .

House Hearings, at 165.

Mr. Rogers. Now I would like for you to tell us
on your schedules [how] you determine what drugs fall within which schedule . . . Start with schedule I on page 12. It is actual or relative potential for abuse.

* * *

Mr. Sonnenreich. High potential for abuse would be considered pretty much as a law enforcement provision. We would have to go out and see what is happening. . . .

Mr. Rogers. What about the characteristics of the drugs? Would that be a consideration?

Mr. Sonnenreich. Almost all of the drugs you have in the narcotic category of schedule I are known already in terms of their addictive quality and things of this nature, but what we are talking about here is their high potential of abuse.

Mr. Rogers. No, this is already determined because we are classifying these drugs as such. This is for new substances that you may classify.

Mr. Sonnenreich. But there are two criteria: One is potential and one is actual, the high potential for abuse. If it is a new drug and we want to classify it, the first question is does it have any potential for abuse and that is theoretical, that is a scientific determination. Then we have the second part of the determination, is there any actual abuse? If it is a known drug, we have to go out and find out whether or not there is actual abuse and that is a law enforcement determination.

Now if it is a theoretical drug that is not out on the streets, the answer is purely hypothetical and medical. If it is a known drug that is on the street, of course we have to collect the other information and point out diversion.

Mr. Rogers. On Schedule II on page 18, 1, a high potential for abuse. We have discussed that.

Mr. Sonnenreich. No, sir, it is different here. Now you are talking about something else. You are talking about a drug that is probably commercially available, a drug that has medical use that is on the street and in this case the criteria and the triggers become far more a law enforcement decision and the legal decision as to whether or not it can go in there because you are dealing with a commercial product to begin with.
You have to demonstrate diversion, you have to show that it is being prescribed by doctors and being used outside the prescription modality, which is a law enforcement function.

Mr. Rogers. First of all, you have to determine whether the characteristics of the drug have any effect for abuse.

Mr. Sonnenreich. There is always, in every one of these schedules, a pharmacological input, but then when we get into this, we are then talking about getting the information and then we have to get all three factors--actual abuse, the using without a medical prescription and the pharmacological information. Then it must be analyzed to see whether or not, in fact, we have a legally sufficient case to proceed.

House Hearings, at 718-19 (emphasis added).

We submit that two propositions are evident from this legislative history. First, in order to properly classify a substance in one of the five schedules in the Controlled Substances Act according to its relative potential for abuse, there must be evidence of a substance's relative potential for abuse.

Second, it is clear from the exchange between Mr. Sonnenreich and Rep. Rogers that where there is "a known drug that is out on the street," the determination of "potential for abuse" must be made on a basis that includes comparative information and evidence about what is actually occurring with the drug compared to the abuse of other drugs.

In short, consistent with common sense, as reflected by the above quoted legislative history, it is clear that the intent of the drafters -- both in the Administration and on the Committee -- was that determinations about
relative abuse potential were to be made on the basis of comparative evidence about the nature of the actual abuse taking place on the street.
6. Evidence on Chemical Structure, Pharmacology, and Animal Data

One overriding point should be made regarding the data discussed in Agency Counsel's Proposed Findings of Fact 1 through 39 with respect to potential for abuse: None of the data recited in those findings provides any basis whatsoever to come to a conclusion about MDMA's relative potential for abuse. We will comment briefly on each category of evidence.

Chemistry

The Agency's Proposed Findings of Fact 1-7 and 9-11 establish that MDMA is a member of a family of chemicals, many of which are psychoactive in one way or another. But the mere existence of that chemical similarity provides no reliable guide to a drug's potential for abuse.
The table reproduced on the next page of this brief is from a document surveying the phenethylamines (see Agency Proposed Finding of Fact number I). This summary was prepared by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. HHS's summary lists 28 phenethylamines. (The list reproduced in the Table sets out 30 numbered compounds because two of the compounds are listed twice, under different names.) At the time the document was prepared in December 1983, 17 of these phenethylamines were not scheduled under the CSA at all; eight were scheduled in Schedule I; two were scheduled in Schedule II; and one was scheduled in Schedule IV.

Subsequently, the Expert Committee on Drug Dependence of the World Health Organization reviewed the abuse potential of all 28 phenethylamines. The Committee recommended that nine of the 17 that are not currently scheduled in the U.S. should be scheduled and controlled internationally. (A.-B20) But the WHO committee did not recommend that the remaining eight phenethylamines be scheduled internationally.7 As reflected in Agency Exhibit B-20, the World Health Organization has recommended that seven of the phenethylamines that it reviewed should go into Schedule I

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7 The eight phenethylamines that are not now scheduled domestically and that have not been recommended for control internationally by the WHO are: clobenzorex (stimulant); fenbutrazate (stimulant); furfenorex (stimulant); morazone (stimulant); para-oxymphetamine (stimulant); 4-bromo-2,5-dimethoxyphenethylamine (hallucinogen); N,N-dimethylamphetamine (stimulant); and N-ethyl-3,4-methylenedioxyamphetamine (hallucinogen).
### SUMMARY OF THE PHENETHYLAMINES

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<th></th>
<th>Medical Use in USA</th>
<th>CSA Schedule</th>
<th>Year Enacted</th>
<th>Stimulant</th>
<th>Hallucigenic</th>
<th>Preclinical Abuse Liability</th>
<th>Clinical Abuse Liability</th>
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<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>LEVOMETHAMPHETAMINE</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>II S 1971</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>MEFENOREX</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>METHOXYAMPHETAMINE*(See 19).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>METHOXYMETHYLENEDIOXYAMPHETAMINE*(See 29)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>METHYLENEDIOXYAMPHETAMINE</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>1H</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>MORAZONE</td>
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<td>NO</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.</td>
<td>PARA-METHOXYAMPHETAMINE*</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>1H 1973</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
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<tr>
<td>20.</td>
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<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
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<tr>
<td>21.</td>
<td>PEMOLINE</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>IV S 1975</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>?</td>
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<tr>
<td>22.</td>
<td>PROPYLHEDRINE</td>
<td>YES*</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
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<tr>
<td>23.</td>
<td>PYROVALERONE</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
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<tr>
<td>24.</td>
<td>TRIMETHOXYAMPHETAMINE</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>1H</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
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<tr>
<td>25.</td>
<td>4-BROMO-2,5-DIMETHOXYPHENETHYLAMINE</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
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<tr>
<td>26.</td>
<td>2,5-DIMETHOXY-4-ETHYLAMPHETAMINE</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27.</td>
<td>N,N-DIMETHYLAMPHETAMINE</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28.</td>
<td>N-ETHYL-3,4-METHYLENEDIOXYAMPHETAMINE</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29.</td>
<td>5-METHOXY-3,4-METHYLENEDIOXYAMPHETAMINE*</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>1H</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30.</td>
<td>3,4-METHYLENEDIOXYMETHAMPHETAMINE</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**DI ETYLPROPIF** | YES | IV S 1973 | + | + |
**MESCALINE** | NO | II S 1971 | + | - |
**PHENETRAMINE** | YES | II S 1971 | + | + |

1: Over-the-counter preparations
+: Positive report
-: Negative report
H: Hallucinogen
*: 15 & 19 are identical compounds
#: 16 & 29 are identical compounds
S: Stimulant
1972: Year the law is enacted

CSA: The Controlled Substances Act (CSA) of the USA

Department of Health and Human Services, "PHENETHYLAMINES", December, 1983
under the Convention on Psychotopic Substances, four should go into Schedule II, and six should go into Schedule IV. Plainly, the simple fact that a chemical is a phenethylamine tells little about where it should be scheduled.

Consider also the research done by Dr. Hardman, an Agency witness, set out in Dr. Hardman's paper which appears as Exhibit GG-18. Dr. Hardman experimented with eight compounds which he identified by Roman Numerals. Compound number I is mescaline; IV is MDA; VIII is MDMA. Of the remaining five drugs (II, III, V, VI, and VII), only one (VII) is scheduled under the CSA. Yet the table on page 300 of Dr. Hardman's paper makes clear that the chemical structural relationships of the 8 drugs are exceedingly close. In particular, by looking at the columns headed "4" and "3" on page 300 of GG-18, one can see that compounds III, IV (MDA), V, and VIII (MDMA) all have the methylenedioxy group added to amphetamine. Yet compound III and compound V are not scheduled drugs.

Like MDMA, compounds III and V differ from MDA only by the addition of a single methyl group (CH₃), yet neither are known to have enough abuse potential to warrant scheduling. Of the total of 32 unique compounds on the HHS list and Dr. Hardman's list, 12 are not controlled substances, and six are scheduled no higher than Schedule IV in either the United States (pemoline) or in the WHO recommendations (fencamfamine, fenproporex, mfenorex, propylhexadrine and pyrobalerone). Therefore, more than
half (18 of 32) of these closely related compounds do not have sufficient abuse potential to be scheduled at all or have only such a low abuse potential that they are appropriately placed in Schedule IV either domestically or internationally.

As Dr. Morris Lipton, the head of one of the nation's leading biomedical research centers, emphasized in his direct testimony, chemical similarity may or may not be a good guide to the actual effects of a compound in the human body. Lipton Direct, at 1-2.8

Pharmacology

The Agency's Proposed Findings of Fact 12 through 19 only suggest that MDMA is a central nervous system (CNS) stimulant. While it is true that MDA and amphetamine are

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8 Agency Counsel's Proposed Finding Number 8 is simply a mis-citation of the scientific record. The three sources in the scientific literature cited by the Agency flatly contradict the finding proposed by Agency Counsel. The scientific literature cited by Agency counsel emphasizes the difference between MDMA and MDA. See GG-4 at 193 ("qualitative differences of their actions"; "opposite optical isomers are responsible for their actions"); GG-25 at 842 (comparable potency but "qualitative aspects of the intoxication are altered"); GG-31 at 292 (MDMA qualitatively similar only to "low levels" of MDA). Prof. Nichols, in his direct testimony, goes into tremendous detail on this issue and directly contradicts the Agency's proposed finding. Nichols direct, at 6-8. And the NIH scientists whose study the agency filed late in the proceeding (A.-B24) specifically assessed the literature as reflecting that MDA and MDMA produced "qualitatively different" intoxications. A-B24, at 3. DEA witness Glennon takes the same position. GG-10, at 808 ("qualitative aspects of the intoxication produced by MDMA apparently differ from those produced by MDA").
CNS stimulants, it is also true that an enormous array of other substances are CNS stimulants, including caffeine and six of the eight phenethylamines that are not currently controlled and are not recommended for control by WHO. CNS stimulants may or may not have a potential for abuse. Placing a substance in that general category is of little assistance in attempting to discern whether or not it should properly be considered to have a potential for abuse or what relative degree of abuse potential it has. For example, all eight of the compounds tested by Dr. Hardman had pharmacological effects similar to each other, yet only four are currently controlled substances. GG-18, at Table II.

**LD-50**

The Agency's Proposed Findings of Fact 22-25 all relate to the LD-50 of MDMA. As Dr. Hardman testified, establishing the LD-50 is a standard toxicological procedure for every drug reviewed by the Food and Drug Administration. Tr. 6, at 18. One could recite countless permutations of what percentage the LD-50 of one drug was of any other. Such an exercise has no significance. It certainly has nothing to do with the abuse potential or the relative safety of a drug. The key variable -- as Dr. Hardman testified -- is the therapeutic index. Tr. 6, at 19. That is, what ratio the LD-50 is to the effective dose. (ED-50). If people are taking doses to achieve the desired effect that are close to the LD-50 dose, then there are obvious safety concerns. (Even then, Dr. Hardman testified that drugs with
an exceedingly low therapeutic index -- such as anesthetics -- can still be safely used and have "accepted safety" under medical supervision. Tr. 6, at 19). As the Agency's own proposed finding (No. 25) notes, the estimated oral LD50 for MDMA is 325 mg/kg. The effective dose is 2 mg/kg. Greer Testimony Regarding Government Exh. B-25, dated November 22, 1985, at 5. If the data on the LD50 of MDMA demonstrates anything, it is that a large margin of safety exists. It says nothing about potential for abuse or relative potential for abuse.

**Studies on Rat Neurotransmitter Levels and Nerve Terminals**

Agency findings 26 through 31 all relate to the effects of MDMA on neurotransmitter levels and nerve terminals in rats. The human significance of the findings has simply not been established. Humans have not been reported to inject MDMA. They take it orally. MDMA is more than six times as potent when injected compared with its potency taken orally. GG-25, at 1. In the studies referenced by agency counsel, injected doses of 2.5 mg/kg and below demonstrated no neurotoxicity. A.-B24, Table 1A. To translate this into the equivalent of a human oral dose, the injected

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9 Dr. Hardman found that the LD-50 of MDMA when injected into a rat was 49 mg/kg (GG-18, at 301). The study carried out by Intox Laboratories estimated that the LD-50 for MDMA when administered orally to rats was approximately 26 mg/kg. (GG-40). Thus it takes six times the injected dose to achieve the same effect when the drug is administered orally.

325

52
dose level must be multiplied by six, to take account of the six-fold difference in potency between injected doses and oral doses. Thus the lowest oral dose level at which any toxic effects would occur would be 15 mg/kg -- more than seven times the therapeutic dosage level and the normal street dosage level of 2 mg/kg.  

It should be noted that the four-day course of repeated injections of MDMA which produced the more serious changes in brain chemistry in Dr. Seiden's study was the equivalent of a 110-pound human being taking oral doses of 6,000 mg, 12,000 mg, or 24,000 mg per day for four days consecutively! It is impossible to reach responsible conclusions about the public health significance of Dr. Seiden's findings with respect to MDMA based on these phenomenally high dosage levels.

But, perhaps most importantly, Dr. Seiden and his colleagues admit that the drug fenfluramine produces the biochemical effects in rat brains not at such high dosage levels but rather at the effective dosage levels at which humans use fenfluramine:

Fenfluramine also produced a long lasting depletion of serotonin in the striatum, hippocampus and rest of brain at a dose (6.25 mg/kg) only 1.25 times the ED₅₀ dose for anorexia. In the case of

10 Dr. Seiden's brief letter report on MDMA does not state what dose he used when he gave the rats only one injection. A-B22. It appears that the lowest dose he used was 10 mg/kg -- or the equivalent of an oral dose of 60 mg/kg. Dr. Seiden's report notes that with one injection, the effect of MDMA on his animals even at this enormously escalated level was only "mildly positive." Id.
the other anorectics, the minimum dose necessary to produce a prolonged neurochemical effect varied from 10 (DEP) to 40 (mazindol) times the ED$_{50}$ dose. It would thus appear that fenfluramine is a significantly more toxic drug than the other anorectics tested. This conclusion is in accord with previous findings by Harvey (1978).

GG-47, at 276.

Fenfluramine is approved for daily use on a chronic basis by the Food and Drug Administration. Dr. Seiden specifically testified that the FDA was made aware in the 1970's that fenfluramine caused these effects and the FDA has taken no action. Tr. 3, at 90. Given the FDA's failure to take fenfluramine off the market or add any warnings or precautions in connection with its use, one cannot conclude that the preliminary results cited by agency counsel with respect to gargantuan doses of MDMA justify any conclusion with respect to a health hazard. This is obviously an area that should be researched more. But its significance at the present time is quite limited.

**Drug Discrimination Studies**

The point of animal drug discrimination studies is to attempt to predict whether drugs will have an abuse potential in humans. Obviously predictions sometimes turn out to be wrong. One of the Agency's own witnesses, Dr. Glennon, has made precisely this point in his writings:

Nevertheless, unless a particular compound has been tested in humans, one cannot be certain that all the structure-activity relationships described in this chapter will apply in the clinical situation. Based on our collective experience, it is likely that the most common error found in animal models is the identification of "false positives." That is, the models may indicate a compound to be active, whereas actual testing in humans reveals inactivity. It is clear that no present animal models correlate with the qualitative differences between hallucinogens observed in humans.

GG-26, at 96-97.

Even then, the drug discrimination studies cited by agency counsel simply do not prove anything with respect to abuse potential. The studies cited by agency counsel were all assessed by NIDA in 1984 when NIDA specifically declared, "the direct evidence that MDMA has any abuse potential in animals is not substantiated, based on the data DEA provided." GG-55. With all due respect, the agency is flogging a dead horse. These studies only demonstrate that animals recognize MDMA as a CNS stimulant. We have discussed above the inadequacy of such evidence to demonstrate abuse potential or relative abuse potential. These studies do, however, unequivocally show that test animals do not recognize MDMA as an hallucinogen. GG-10, at 811.12

12 In this connection, one misstatement in the Agency's brief should be noted. Their proposed finding 39 misinterprets the study they cite. Their proposed finding is directly contradicted by their own witness. DOM is a known hallucinogen against which other drugs are tested. The authors of the document cited by Agency Counsel (one of whom is the Agency's witness Dr. Glennon) specifically interpreted the data cited by Agency Counsel as denoting a lack of generalization, not partial generalization as agency counsel attempts to claim:

(Footnote continued)
The Agency attempts to make capital out of the fact that animals trained to recognize MDA also recognize MDMA. But that fact is highly misleading. MDA is unique among chemicals in being recognized by animals who are trained to recognize hallucinogens and also by animals trained to recognize stimulants. The agency's own witness established this fact in the scientific literature. A-A6.

MDMA does not share this dual response characteristic of MDA. GG-10, at 810-811. The dual character of MDA means that animals trained to recognize MDA who also respond to MDMA are simply responding to the CNS stimulant characteristic of MDMA.

In any event, the evidence in the record on the qualitative differences in humans between MDA and MDMA is uncontradicted. Dr. Alexander Shulgin, a leading researcher who has researched the effects in humans of both MDA and MDMA, and Dr. Richard Yensen, a clinical psychologist who has carried out experiments with humans with MDA and who is familiar with MDMA, both submitted information on the different effects in humans of MDA and MDMA. GG-30, at 1-3; Yensen Rebuttal at 1-2. The scientific literature overwhelming supports this view. See fn. 8, supra.

(Footnote 12 continued from previous page)

The lack of generalization between (+)-DOM and the N-monomethyl derivatives of MDA [meaning MDMA] is also consistent with the report that the qualitative effects of these derivatives in man are different from those produced by (+)-MDA.

GG-10, at 811.
Self-Administration Studies

The two self-administration studies submitted into the record -- at the last minute -- by the Agency in fact undermine agency counsel's case, not support it. Dr. Harris, in his submission (A.-B23), reports that his tests indicated that MDMA was only "one-third to one-fourth as potent as d-amphetamine in stimulating locomotor activity"; and that MDMA "does not produce physical dependence." A.B23, at 2-3. With respect to reinforcing properties, Dr. Harris reported on three monkeys. One monkey self-administered MDMA "robustly." A second monkey "could not satisfy our demanding criteria for concluding that they [the doses of MDMA] were serving as reinforcers." One monkey "did not self-administer MDMA at any dose tested." A.-B23, at 3.

We respectfully submit that, viewed objectively, Dr. Harris' data suggests that MDMA has less of a potential for abuse rather than more.

Dr. Griffiths' study involved an effort to measure whether three baboons would self-administer MDMA. One baboon did not self-administer; one did self-administer, but at levels of self-administration "below those maintained by cocaine, d-amphetamine and phencyclidine in previous experiments," and one baboon apparently self-administered erratically. When Dr. Griffiths originally submitted his paper, his conclusion was that the preliminary results of his experiment indicated that "MDMA has moderate reinforcing effi-
cacy." A.-B21A (Emphasis added). We submit that the results of Dr. Griffiths' experiment, again if viewed objectively, are in fact highly ambiguous. In comments submitted on his study, we noted a number of severe methodological problems that, in our judgment, demonstrate that the data reported is not reliable and may not be scientifically reproducible. Response to Agency Exhibits B-21, B-22, and B-23 by Drs. Grinspoon, et al., Nov. 4, 1985, at 2-6. But even accepting Dr. Griffiths' original evaluation of his results, he concluded that MDMA had only "moderate" reinforcing efficacy.

These inconclusive and highly ambiguous results from these animal studies hardly prove anything. They certainly cannot compare in probative value to the evidence in the record about the actual relatively low level of MDMA use "on the streets," or to the testimony of psychiatrists who have administered the drug and who have professional opinions about the drug's low potential for abuse based on direct clinical observations. See supra, pp. 35-47.
5. **Evidence on Potential for Abuse and Proposed Findings of Fact**

We now turn to consider the evidence in the record with respect to the nature of the abuse potential of MDMA. What is critical here is the *relative* potential for abuse of MDMA, for only a determination about the relative potential for abuse can determine the Schedule into which MDMA should be placed.

Agency counsel has the burden of proof in seeking to place MDMA into Schedule I. 21 C.F.R. § 1316.56. Therefore, the initial issue is whether Agency counsel has met its burden of *proving* that MDMA has a *high* potential for abuse. Drs. Greer, Grinspoon, *et al.*, agree that MDMA has a potential for abuse, but we submit that the evidence demonstrates that MDMA does not have a high potential for abuse.

The DEA seized its first sample of MDMA in 1972. A.-B2, Attachment 1. The scientific literature introduced into this proceeding indicates that scientists have been writing about MDMA in the open literature since the 1970s. GG-18; GG-1. The record, therefore, reflects nearly 14 years of actual experience with MDMA in determining its potential for abuse.
Agency counsel devotes their first 42 Findings of Fact on the issue of potential for abuse to a discussion of (1) the chemical structural relationships between MDMA and other drugs; (2) the pharmacological effects of MDMA and other drugs; (3) animal drug discrimination studies; (4) animal self-administration studies; and (5) recent studies of the biochemical effects of certain drugs in rat brains. As we will discuss below, this evidence does not provide any support for finding that MDMA has a high potential abuse. But putting that to one side for the moment, the significance of this evidence with respect to a drug's potential for abuse by humans must, of necessity, give way in the case of a drug that is "on the street" to evidence with respect to the actual extent of human abuse.

Agency counsel addresses the evidence in the record bearing on abuse by humans in its proposed Findings of Fact numbered 43 through 72. Notable -- by its absence -- is any comparison of the evidence on abuse of MDMA relative to abuse of other drugs. The reason is that, by every measure in the current record, MDMA abuse can only be found to be low or moderate in comparison to the abuse of other drugs scheduled under the Controlled Substances Act.

We are not in any way seeking to downplay any of the evidence in the record about the use of MDMA outside therapeutic settings. Nor do we seek to downplay in any way the fact that any drug not used pursuant to medical supervision is potentially dangerous. The evidence plainly demon-
strates that use outside therapeutic settings is taking place. It is for that reason that Drs. Greer, Grinspoon, et al., have advocated from the very beginning of this proceeding that MDMA should be scheduled.

But, by the same token, we strongly believe that Agency counsel have not sustained their burden of proving that MDMA has a "high" potential for abuse justifying its classification in Schedule I.

Because the evidence of the extent of actual abuse of MDMA over the past 14 years is by far the most important evidence bearing on the finding of the relative abuse potential of MDMA, we turn first to that evidence. Subsequently, we will consider the evidence in the record on chemistry, pharmacology and animal data.

(a) Fourteen-year Record Concerning MDMA

The record contains twelve separate categories of evidence bearing on the extent of use of MDMA over the past 14 years. We will discuss each one in turn.

(1) Medical Examiner Reports Contained in the Drug Abuse Warning Network Data

The National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) publishes annually a compilation of drug abuse information collected through its Drug Abuse Warning Network (DAWN). This data collection system collects reports from selected (currently more than 700) hospital emergency rooms in the United States. The reports collected record all visits to those emergency rooms for medical problems associated with
drug abuse. According to NIDA, the major objectives of the DAWN system include the following:

- To monitor drug abuse patterns and trends and to detect new abuse entities and new combinations;
- To assess health hazards associated with drug abuse.5

The record reflects that from 1972 through September 15, 1983, there had been a grand total of eight mentions of MDMA in the DAWN system. A.-B2, at 7, Attachment 5. During the period 1972 through 1983, the DAWN system was reporting approximately 175,000 drug mentions each year. GG-7. Tr. 5, at 76-77. Thus, the eight mentions of MDMA occurred during a period during which DAWN reported roughly 5 million mentions of other drugs. Exhibit 7 of Drs. Greer, Grinspoon, et al., reproduces the summary page of the annual DAWN reports. Plainly, MDMA does not even remotely compare with such Schedule I drugs as heroin, marijuana, and LSD.

During the time period that MDMA was mentioned 8 times, MDA was mentioned 344 times -- more than 40 times as frequently. A.-B4, at 2. MDMA does not compare with the frequency with which Schedule II drugs appear on the list. Nor, in fact, does it compare with the mentions of Schedule III drugs or Schedule IV drugs. Indeed, the Department of HHS called the eight mentions of MDMA "not significant." Exhibit A.-B4, at 2.

5 National Institute on Drug Abuse, Data from the Drug Abuse Warning Network (DAWN), Annual Data 1983, at 1.
(2) **DAWN Medical Examiner Mentions**

The DAWN data system of the National Institute on Drug Abuse also compiles from selected medical examiners in the United States data reflecting drugs mentioned in connection with drug abuse deaths. From 1972 through September 15, 1983, MDMA was mentioned in connection with one drug abuse death. A-B2, Attachment 5, at 22. The evidence in the record reflects the fact that the identification of the drug involved in that overdose death is seriously suspect. A-B18; Tr. 3, at 50-52; GG-30. But, more importantly, the DAWN data system reports on approximately 3,000 drug abuse deaths each year. Tr. 5, at 74. Therefore, during the 1972 through 1983 period, the DAWN system reported on approximately 30,000 to 35,000 drug abuse deaths. MDMA was mentioned only once -- and there is substantial question as to whether it was accurately identified in that instance.

(3) **Community Epidemiological Data of the National Institute on Drug Abuse**

The National Institute on Drug Abuse also compiles drug abuse information on a regular and methodical basis from its designated representative in 20 metropolitan areas throughout the United States. From June, 1981 through December, 1984, the National Institute on Drug Abuse convened these Community Epidemiological Work Group meetings every six months. NIDA specifically states that the work group proceedings are intended to (1) provide accurate and timely assessment of drug abuse patterns and trends and (2) iden-
tify emerging drugs of abuse. During each of these twice yearly meetings there was substantial discussion by each representative from each of the 20 metropolitan areas of the drug abuse patterns in those metropolitan regions. In the course of those discussions, more than 120 different individual drugs were discussed and the nature and extent of the drug abuse associated with each of those drugs was identified.

During that period of time MDMA was never mentioned by any NIDA representative from any metropolitan area. Stipulation by parties, Tr. 6, at 10-13.

(4) Laboratory Seizures

The evidence in the record reflects that during the period 1972 through 1983, DEA seized four clandestine drug laboratories which had the capacity to manufacture MDMA. A.-B2, at Attachment 4. During this 12-year period of time, DEA was seizing approximately 200 clandestine laboratories each year, meaning that DEA seized approximately 2,400 laboratories. Tr. 63-64. Only four had a capacity to produce MDMA.

Further, other DEA figures indicate that during the 7-year period 1977 through 1983, DEA seized 31 laboratories that in total had the capacity to produce 14,000 kilograms of MDA. Tr. 5, at 66. During the same period of time, DEA seized two laboratories with a capacity to manufacture 2.7 kilograms of MDMA. Tr. 5, at 67.
Exhibits of Drug Evidence Submitted to DEA Laboratories

During the period 1972 through 1983, DEA laboratories received a total of 44 evidentiary exhibits of substances identified as MDMA. A.-B2, at Attachment 1. These exhibits were received by the DEA laboratories at a steady rate of between 3 and 5 exhibits each year throughout the 12-year period. Ibid. During the same period of time, DEA laboratories were receiving between 30,000 and 40,000 drug exhibits each year. Tr. 5, at 60. The DEA made no effort to ascertain how MDMA seizures compared to MDA seizures or to the seizures of any other drugs. Id.

Data From Drug Treatment Facilities

DEA called one witness from a drug treatment facility. That witness was Daryl Inaba from the Haight-Ashbury Free Medical Clinic in San Francisco, California. Mr. Inaba testified that out of a total case load of approximately 400 clients each month, the Free Clinic had between three and four patients who reported drug abuse problems with the family of drugs including MDA, MDMA, MMDA, etc. Tr. 2, at 77-78. Thus, Mr. Inaba estimated that clients using MDMA would be less than one percent of the total client load and could be less than one-quarter of one percent. Id. Furthermore, Mr. Inaba testified that the Free Clinic had tested three samples of drugs that their clients had believed were MDMA and discovered that only one of the three was in fact MDMA. Tr. 2, at 87.
Thus the actual percentage of their clients in reality using MDMA might be even less. If this was the drug abuse clinic the agency chose to have testify, it is fair to conclude that other clinics reported even less experience with MDMA.

Dr. Lance Wright, a witness called by Drs. Grinspoon, Greer, et al., is a Philadelphia psychiatrist with affiliations at Hahnemann University, at the University of Pennsylvania, and as a Staff psychiatrist in the drug abuse treatment at the Philadelphia V.A. Hospital. Dr. Wright testified that there had been no reported incidents of MDMA abuse in the treatment system in the Philadelphia area, and that he had spoken with colleagues in New York and Boston and had found no evidence of problems there. Wright Direct, at 1-2.

(7) DEA Written Survey in 1979

In mid-1979, Frank Sapienza of the DEA staff wrote to 17 law enforcement agencies in the United States seeking information on synthesis and trafficking in MDMA. Tr. 5, at 42. The response that the DEA received to those 17 letters were:

- Nine of the agencies did not respond at all;
- Five responded that they had not encountered any MDMA;
- Three wrote to the DEA that they had received some samples of MDMA.

Tr. 5, at 42.
(8) MICROGRAM Request of 1982

The Drug Enforcement Administration publishes a publication entitled "MICROGRAM". This publication is intended exclusively for law enforcement personnel. It is sent to approximately 1,400 law enforcement agencies -- 1,200 in the United States and 200 abroad. Tr. 7, at 171. In 1982, the DEA included in two or three issues of MICROGRAM a request for information from law enforcement agencies on any trafficking or synthesis of MDMA that the agencies had encountered. Tr. 5, at 46-47.

The DEA received precisely three responses to its inquiry. Tr.5 at 48-49.

(9) MICROGRAM Request of 1985

In March 1985, DEA published another notice in MICROGRAM. This edition of MICROGRAM similarly went to some 1,400 law enforcement agencies and forensic laboratories. The Drug Enforcement Administration received no responses whatsoever to this inquiry. GG-41, at 2.

(10) MDMA Use in Texas

The DEA put on the testimony of only one special agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration. This single agent was from Dallas, Texas. The agent testified that, prior to June or July 1984, the DEA had no information with respect to MDMA use in the Dallas area. Tr. 3, at 117. Moreover, Agent Chester testified that information had come to his attention concerning other non-controlled drugs prior to June 1984. Tr. 3, at 118. Subsequently, the agent's
direct testimony indicates that MDMA was used and detected
by the DEA in certain night clubs and that it was, at least
by reputation, available on campuses in the Dallas area.
The DEA put in no first hand testimony whatsoever from any
other area of the country, and had no other special agents
testify.

(11) PharmChem Laboratories
  Sample Analyses

The DEA also submitted evidence indicating that a
private testing laboratory -- PharmChem -- had received
samples of MDMA to be analyzed during the period 1976-1984.
The highest number of samples ever received during a year
was 18, and during most years there were less than five
samples of MDMA a year. These are very low numbers. Moreo-
over, given the extensive nature of the government's efforts
to obtain information on the abuse of drugs through NIDA,
agency counsel's reliance on PharmChem only underlines the
weakness of their case. The agency is turning to any source
it can just to prove there is some abuse of MDMA.

(12) Testimony by Expert Witnesses

One subject produced total unanimity among every
expert witness that addressed the issue. Both agency wit-
nesses and witnesses for Drs. Grinspoon, Greer, et al.,
agreed that individuals did not use MDMA intensively and
that there was no tendency toward dependence upon MDMA what-
soever. All the psychiatric witnesses testified that in-
creasing the dosage and frequency of use produced more un-
pleasant than pleasant effects. Greer Direct, at 9-11; Zinberg Direct, at 1; Ingrasci Direct, at 5; Wolfson Direct, at 10-11; Strassman Direct, at 11-12; Downing Direct, at 8; Wright Direct, at 2. In addition, Richard Seymour on the staff of the Haight-Ashbury Free Clinic testified that their clinic did not see recurrent, long-term, or habitual use of MDMA. Seymour Direct, at 3. Prof. Ronald Siegel, a witness for the agency, also testified that his informal interviews did not detect habitual use. Siegel Direct, at 2-3.

(b) No Proof of High Potential for Abuse

All the evidence is consistent.

• First, every piece of officially compiled data reflects a low absolute level of MDMA usage.

6 Prof. Siegel also provided an estimate of the number of dosage units of MDMA he believed were being distributed in the United States. Prof. Siegel claimed to have made his estimates based on interviews with illicit manufacturers and distributors, and he recounted a number of alleged contacts with law violators. Tr. 8, at 36-40. Prof. Siegel testified that many of the things he was told were "weird." Tr. 8, at 38-39. In terms of his own "research" on MDMA use, Prof. Siegel testified that he had no protocol for his research. Tr. 8, at 48. He testified that for purposes of his research he had a list of the procedures he utilized and the order in which the procedures are administered. Tr. 8, at 48. He was asked to produce this list for the record, id., but he merely provided a typed letter written after his testimony which is not even remotely a scientific document. GG - 58. We submit that Prof. Siegel's estimates do not have a credible foundation. Even taking Prof. Siegel's estimate at face value, his estimate would suggest that the annual production of MDMA in the United States is approximately 360,000 dosage units per year. The House Report on the Controlled Substances Act suggested that evidence of diversion of several hundred thousand dosage units would constitute sufficient evidence of "potential for abuse" to justify controlling a drug, but not of a "high" potential for abuse.
• Second, every piece of officially compiled data reflects a steady level of low usage -- with no trend toward any increase over the 12 year period.

• Third, all evidence in the record comparing actual MDMA usage to MDA usage reflects MDMA's usage being many times less prevalent than MDA.

• Fourth, every witness including DEA witnesses who addressed the issue held the view that MDMA was not used in high amounts or with high frequency. All of the psychiatrists who had interviewed people who had used MDMA or who had administered MDMA felt that the nature of MDMA's effects meant that people did not seek to use higher doses or to use it frequently.

In sum, the evidence demonstrates that MDMA has been used outside the medical setting. That finding justifies control. But the relatively moderate to low extent of its use compels a finding that it does not have a high potential for abuse.

During the cross-examination sessions, Agency witnesses occasionally sought to explain why individual pieces of data showing a low level of MDMA usage should not be taken at face value. Drs. Greer, Grinspoon, et al., respectfully submit that the consistently low numbers reflected across the entire spectrum of evidence in the record -- including every official compilation of data measuring drug use and abuse in the U.S. -- cannot be explained away.
Moreover, it is important to recognize that MDMA during this period was not a controlled substance. If individuals wanted to produce it or buy it, there was no risk of arrest or criminal deterrent to doing so. Despite this, the incidence of use of MDMA remained relatively low.

Under these circumstances, Drs. Greer, Grinspoon, et al., respectfully submit that the evidence cannot support a finding that MDMA has a "high" potential for abuse. On the basis of its potential for abuse, the evidence requires that MDMA should be found to have less than a high potential for abuse and should be placed in Schedule III.
B. Accepted Medical Use in Treatment in the United States

The second criterion specified by the CSA for determining whether a substance goes into Schedule I or another Schedule is whether the substance has an "accepted medical use in treatment in the United States." Drs. Greer, Grinspoon, et al., submit that the phrase "accepted medical use in treatment" means what it says -- namely, that a
determination must be made as to whether the medical community accepts the use of a particular drug in medical treatment. The statutory language does not mean something wholly different from its plain meaning as the Agency contends -- namely, whether or not a manufacturer has been licensed by the FDA to engage in the interstate shipment and sale of the drug. There are many non-medical reasons why a manufacturer might not have obtained approval to ship a drug on an interstate basis -- lack of financial return is the most obvious and the most frequent in actual practice.

Drs. Grinspoon, Greer, et al., submit that their position is the only one consistent with the statutory language, the legislative history, accepted interpretations of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, and the existing responsibility of the States to regulate medical practice.

1. The Statutory Language of the Controlled Substances Act

The Supreme Court of the United States has declared that "the meaning of the statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the language in which the act is framed, and if that is plain, . . . the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms." Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 61 L. Ed. 442, 37 S. Ct. 917 (1917). The consequence of the so-called "plain meaning" rule has been stated as follows:
"One who questions the application of the plain meaning rule to a provision of an act must show either that some other section of the act expands or restricts its meaning, that the provision itself is repugnant to the general purview of the act, or that the act considered in pari materia with other acts, or with the legislative history of the subject act, imports a different meaning. If the language is plain, unambiguous and uncontrolled by other parts of the act or other acts upon the same subject, the court cannot give it a different meaning."

**Sutherland Stat Const** § 46.01, at 74 (4th ed.) (footnotes omitted).

Drs. Greer, Grinspoon, *et al.*, respectfully submit that the agency cannot make any showing that would justify a departure from clear statutory language. Indeed, all the factors cited by the Sutherland treatise reinforce the plain meaning. To depart from the plain meaning requires ignoring legislative history, ignoring other provisions of the CSA, contradicting long-standing interpretations of the federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, ignoring the rights of individual States to approve the intra-state marketing of drugs, and ignoring the responsibilities of States to regulate medical practice.

In the present case, the Controlled Substances Act is perfectly clear. The Act refers to "accepted medical use in treatment." That phrase is clear. It refers to what is "accepted" in a "medical" setting for "treatment." What is relevant to that determination is evidence of medical opinion with respect to whether the use of a particular sub-
stance in medical treatment is accepted within the medical community as an appropriate course of treatment. Such evidence is familiar in the law of medical malpractice and the law of medical licensing and discipline within the various states of the United States, as will be set out further below.

The statute nowhere refers to the question whether a substance has an NDA or has been otherwise approved by the Food and Drug Administration for interstate shipment and sale. It would have been an exceedingly simple matter for the Congress to provide such a criterion.

The Congress knows how to write such a provision, as numerous cross-references in the CSA to the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act demonstrate. For example, the Congress in the Controlled Substances Act defined the term "drug" by specific reference to the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, see 21 U.S.C. § 802 (12); excluded non-narcotic over-the-counter drugs from the statutory scheduling scheme by specific reference to the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, see 21 U.S.C. § 811(g)(1); specifically referred to the investigational new drug provisions of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act in § 307(c)(2)(A) and in § 307(e) of the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 827(c)(2)(A), 827(f),* imposed

labeling and packaging requirements based on specific references to the provisions of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, see §§ 305(a), 305(b) of the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 825(a), 825(b);* and imposed obligations with respect to dispensing by prescriptions by references to specific determinations under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, see §§ 309(a), 309(b) of the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 829(a), 829(d).*

But the Congress plainly chose not to refer to determinations under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act when it required findings to be made about "accepted medical use."

2. Legislative History

Agency counsel references only one instance in the legislative history of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (Pub. L. 91-513) in which the definition of the term "accepted medical use" was discussed: testimony by Dr. John Jennings, then Acting Director of the Bureau of Drugs, Food and Drug Administration. The Agency selectively -- and unfortunately therefore misleadingly -- quotes from Dr. Jennings' testimony.

More importantly Agency counsel omits any reference to numerous more extensive and more important passages in testimony by Administration witnesses to the Congress. That testimony demonstrates beyond any legitimate question that the determination of "accepted medical use" was to be determined by the medical community on the basis of medical
evidence -- not exclusively by looking at whether FDA had approved an NDA.

Dr. Jennings' testimony on this subject was, in full, as follows:

Q:  Let me ask one question: when a drug is under investigation pursuant to investigational new drug applications, is the drug considered to have an accepted medical use?

Dr. Jennings: Usually not, although it might.

Q: Could you enlarge on that?

Dr. Jennings: Yes, sir. The exemption for investigational use is usually granted for a drug for which the medical use has not been established, so in most cases that would be so, there would not be an accepted medical use.

However, drugs that have one or maybe several accepted medical uses might be under investigation for additional medical uses.

Q: But in the great majority of the cases --

Dr. Jennings: It would be true that the accepted medical use would not have been established.

House Hearings, at 343.

Much more important testimony, however, was given by three Administration witnesses -- all more senior than Dr. Jennings -- testifying before the Subcommittee on Public Health and Welfare of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce -- the subcommittee which ultimately drafted the bill that became the Controlled Substances Act. These witnesses were Michael R. Sonnenreich, Deputy Chief Counsel of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, the DEA's predecessor agency; John Ingersoll, Director of BNDD;
and Dr. Roger Egeberg, Assistant Secretary of HEW. The relevant portions of their testimony were as follows:

Mr. Sonnenreich: [Criterion] Two [no accepted medical use] is a factual determination and normally where we get such information is through the AMA or WHO. You don't have to be a doctor to find out whether or not it has an accepted medical use in the United States or not. So the fact that you are asking whether it has got accepted medical use is something that a lawyer can find out as well as a doctor.

House Hearings, at 165 (emphasis added).

Mr. Rogers: Under Schedule I drugs. Would HEW or the Department of Justice be able to determine on a drug a lack of accepted safety for use under medical supervision?

Dr. Egeberg: I would think that HEW would expect to have a good deal to say on that.

Mr. Rogers: All right. HEW would have the competence there. I think this would be admitted. What about no accepted medical use in the United States?

Dr. Egeberg: Well, I would think that HEW would be the primary source, through its various agencies and its contacts, for information on that subject.

House Hearings, at 194 (emphasis added).

Mr. Ingersoll: I must also point out that this review [prior registration of researchers by the Department of Justice] is only required for Schedule I substances which the medical profession has already determined have no legitimate medical use in the United States.

House Hearings, at 678 (emphasis added).

Mr. Rogers: So the only category of [Schedule] I is simply for research?
Mr. Sonnenreich: Yes, sir, and that is because they have no medical use as determined by the medical community.

House Hearings, at page 696 (emphasis added).

Mr. Sonnenreich: Mainly, our feeling is that the trigger on your Schedule I drugs which are really different from your II, III and IV drugs. It is this basic determination that is not made by any part of the federal government. It is made by the medical community as to whether or not the drug has medical use or doesn't.

Mr. Rogers: If it has medical use, Food and Drug probably would have authorized it, wouldn't they?

Mr. Sonnenreich: I assume so, sir.

House Hearings, at 718 (emphasis added).

Several observations are appropriate about the testimony set out above of Messrs. Ingersoll and Sonnenreich, and Drs. Egeberg and Jennings. First, it is clear that Dr. Jennings did not testify that the issuance of an NDA determined whether or not a drug had "accepted medical use." Specifically, Dr. Jennings responded to a question as to whether a drug "under investigation" was "considered to have" an accepted medical use. Dr. Jennings' response was that an investigational drug would "usually not" have an accepted medical use, "although it might." Dr. Jennings never spoke to the question of how one would determine whether a drug had an "accepted medical use." And Dr. Jennings specifically emphasized that it was possible that some drugs under investigation "might" have an "accepted medical use."
Second, the testimony of the other three Administration witnesses all speaks much more directly to the issue of the meaning of "accepted medical use." Mr. Sonnenreich, who earlier in this proceeding was cited by the Agency as a leading authority on the CSA, makes clear that the Department of Justice would look to the American Medical Association and to the World Health Organization to provide information on "accepted medical use." He further emphasized that the determination as to whether a drug has a medical use was to be made "by the medical community," and specifically not by "by any part of the federal government."

Plainly, neither the Administration witnesses nor theCongressmen asking the questions believed that the Food and Drug Administration was to determine "accepted medical use" exclusively on the basis of whether the FDA had issued an NDA to the manufacturer of a drug. To the contrary, Mr. Sonnenreich, representing the Department of Justice and testifying before the House Subcommittee which ultimately drafted the bill which became law, specifically informed the Committee that "accepted medical use" as used in the definition of Schedule I substances was to be "determined by the medical community," and "not by the Federal government."

5 Agency counsel and Mr. Joranson cite materials prepared by the Commissioners on Uniform Laws pertaining to various interpretations of phrases in the Controlled Substances Act. We respectfully submit that it is the statutory language of the Controlled Substances Act and the intent of Congress as reflected in the relevant legislative history that control the interpretation of the statutory
It is difficult to imagine a clearer statement that agency counsel's current position is wrong.

3. The D.C. Circuit Ruling

The D.C. Circuit in NORML v. DEA, 559 F.2d 745, 750 (D.C. Cir. 1977), rejected the idea that an NDA determined whether a substance had an "accepted medical use":

... respondent [DEA] further argues that placement in Schedule I is mandated because there is "no approved New Drug Application" for marihuana. This reference is to the procedure by which persons who wish to ship substances in interstate commerce apply to the Secretary of HEW for approval of a New Drug Application (NDA) under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. Respondent argues that this procedure establishes whether a substance has "an accepted safety for use," and concludes that "[r]escheduling of marihuana would be impossible under the [Controlled Substances] Act without a reappraisal from the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare."

The interrelationship between the two Acts is far from clear. ... Respondent provides no reason to suppose Congress intended that the NDA institutional check necessarily precede the CSA check. Even if NORML were to obtain approval of an NDA for marihuana, it would then have to apply to DEA to reschedule the drug. We think it not inappropriate for NORML to apply first for rescheduling under the CSA. (citations omitted).

(Footnote 5 continued from previous page)

phrases at issue. We have a further problem with Mr. Joranson's survey. On cross-examination, Mr. Joranson acknowledged that his survey was directed to the Controlled Substances Boards of the various states. Tr. 6, at 52-53. He acknowledged that he had not surveyed the medical licensing authorities in each of the fifty states, nor had he sought the views of state or national medical associations. Tr. 6, at 61. We respectfully submit that it is the medical licensing boards of the various states who are really the most appropriate state officials to speak to the proper interpretation of state laws having to do with "accepted medical use" and "accepted safety for use under medical supervision."
The D.C. Circuit's decision is consistent with the longstanding recognition that the Food and Drug Administration does not determine what is and what is not accepted medical use of drugs in the course of the practice of medicine. It is to that subject that we now turn.
4. The Food and Drug Administration
Does Not Regulate Medical Practice
Or Determine Accepted Medical Use

a. Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act

The FDCA Act was enacted in 1938 after legislative efforts spanning several years. The first bill to pass
either house of Congress that was substantially similar to
the present Act included within its definition of "drug" the
qualification that it did not apply "for the regulation of
the legalized practice of the healing art." In explaining
this proviso, the committee reports emphasized that the bill
was "not intended as a medical practices act, and [would]
not interfere with the practice of the healing art by chiro-
practors and others in the States where they are licensed by
law to engage in such practice." While the definition of
"drug" as ultimately enacted did not include this proviso
(see U.S.C. 721(g)), the legislative history nonetheless

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74th Cong., 1st Sess. 201(b), 79 Cong. Rec. 8351 (1935).

S. Rep. No. 361, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1935); S.
makes it very clear that Congress did not intend the Act to apply to the state-regulated practice of medicine -- a proposition that both the FDA and the courts have recognized as set out below.

Moreover, Congress has in several other respects specifically provided for deference to state law under the FDC Act. The drug provisions of the Act do not apply, for example, to drugs wholly in intrastate commerce. 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(b), 331. The Act also relies on state law to determine who is entitled to practice medicine within a state and who, under the prescription drug provisions of the Act, may be authorized to administer prescription drugs. 21 U.S.C. § 353(b). Further, the Act generally defers to state law in areas that do not directly conflict with it.9

b. Repeated FDA Interpretations Emphasize that the FDA Does Not Regulate Medical Practice

The Food and Drug Administration has repeatedly interpreted the provisions of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to forbid the FDA from regulating the practice of medicine. This issue has most frequently arisen when the FDA

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9 See, e.g., Section 202 of the 1962 Amendments to the FDC Act (Pub. L. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780):

Nothing in the Amendments made by this Act to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act shall be construed as invalidating any provision of state law which would be valid in the absence of such amendments unless there is a direct and positive conflict between such Amendments and such provision of state law.
has considered the widespread practice of physicians using marketed drugs for uses which the FDA has not approved: that is, for uses outside the confines of their labeling. In 1972, the agency summed up its view of this subject when, in the preamble to a proposed rule on drug labeling, it stated:

If an approved new drug is shipped in interstate commerce with the approved package insert and neither the shipper nor the recipient intends it be used for an unapproved purpose, the requirements of section 505 of the Act are satisfied.

Once the new drug is in a local pharmacy after interstate shipment, the physician may, as part of the practice of medicine, lawfully prescribe a different dosage for his patient, or may otherwise vary the conditions of use from those approved in the package insert, without informing or obtaining the approval of the Food and Drug Administration.

This interpretation of the Act is consistent with congressional intent as indicated in the legislative history of the 1938 Act and the drug amendments of 1962. Throughout the debate leading to enactment, there were repeated statements that Congress did not intend the Food and Drug Administration to interfere with medical practice and references to the understanding that the bill did not purport to regulate the practice of medicine as between the physician and the patient. Congress recognized a

10 Under the FDC Act, the labeling of any prescription drug, whether subject to approval or not, must be adequate for the drug's intended purposes. In the case of prescription drugs (as opposed to "over-the-counter" drugs available without a prescription), the requirements are met by conditioning availability on a practitioner's prescription, and on there being labeling directions for physicians and pharmacists (as opposed to laymen) as to the proper prescribing, dispensing, and administration of the drug. 21 C.F.R. § 201.100.
patient's right to seek civil damages in the courts if there should be evidence of malpractice, and declined to provide any legislative restrictions upon the medical profession.


Subsequently, in 1975, the Food and Drug Administration wrote as follows:

The comments recommended that the proposed regulations be revised to require an appropriate statement in package inserts that, in addition to the conditions of use which the manufacturer may recommend to physicians in compliance with the law and Food and Drug Administration regulations, there are other conditions of use for which the drug may be regarded as safe and effective on the basis of the experience of critical physicians using the drug in the practice of medicine over a period of years.

The Commissioner stated in a separate notice of proposed rulemaking published in the Federal Register of August 15, 1972 (37 Fed. Reg. 16503), concerning the use of a drug for conditions not included in its labeling, that the labeling does not intend either to preclude the physician's use of his best judgment in the interest of the patient or to impose liability if he does not follow the package insert. The Commissioner clearly recognizes that the labeling of a marketed drug does not always contain all the most current information available to physicians relating to the proper use of the drug in good medical practice. Advances in medical knowledge and practice inevitably precede the labeling revision by the manufacturer and formal labeling approval by the Food and Drug Administration. Good medical practice and patient interest thus require that physicians be free to use drugs according to their best knowledge and judgment. Certainly where a physician uses a drug for a use not in the approved labeling,
he has the responsibility to be well informed about the drug and to base such use on a firm scientific rationale or on sound medical evidence, and to maintain adequate medical records of the drug's use and effects, but such usage in the practice of medicine is not in violation of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.


In 1979, the Food and Drug Administration once more reiterated this view:

Good medical practice and patient welfare require that physicians remain free to use drugs according to their best knowledge and judgment. . . .


Once again, in June, 1983, the FDA repeated its view that it does not have the authority to regulate the practice of medicine:

Although no final rule has been issued on this subject, the Agency has continued to apply the principle set forth in the preamble to the 1972 proposal. In FDA's Drug Bulletin of April 1982, the Agency sought to clarify and reiterate the position that the Act does not regulate the "practice of medicine." Once a drug product has been approved for marketing, a physician may, in treating patients, prescribe the drug for uses not included in the drug's approved labeling. The primary legal constraints in that situation are State laws on medical practice and products liability law. The IND Rewrite proposal would codify the Agency's longstanding position that the regulations do not apply to the "practice of medicine," though the proposal does not purport to define with specificity such practice in terms of the Act.


Finally, the Food and Drug Administration reemphasized this position in a filing with the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in 1983. In the course of its argument in the 1983 case, the FDA emphasized the

commonly recognized exception to the Act's broad and protective coverage: the practice-of-medicine' exemption. FDCA's legislative history expresses a specific intent to prohibit FDA from regulating physicians' practice of medicine. According to the Commissioner, FDCA does not regulate physicians in their practice because physicians are licensed by the states. Letter from the Commissioner at 3, JA 88.


c. Use of Drugs Not Approved By the FDA

Similarly, it is clear that the Food and Drug Act does not determine the medical propriety of using drugs that have not been approved at all by the Food and Drug Administration for interstate shipment and sale. Drs. Grinspoon, Greer, et al., specifically submitted, as their Exhibits 15 and 38, opinions of the Legislative Counsel of the State of California and the California State Attorney General. These opinions made clear that, as a legal matter, doctors within the State of California are free to exercise their medical judgment to prescribe and administer drugs that have not been approved either by the FDA or by the State for commercial shipment and sale. These opinions specifically concluded, as follows, in the words of the Legislative Counsel of California:

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The [California] Sherman Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Law does not prevent a physician from prescribing, or a pharmacist acting pursuant to the order of a physician from dispensing, a drug not approved in a federal or state new drug application.

The Food and Drug Administration of the United States Department of Health and Human Services has also informed us that, in its opinion, it does not have the authority under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to prevent a physician, or a pharmacist acting pursuant to the order of a physician, from prescribing a drug not approved in a federal new drug application.

Letter dated May 26, 1981, from Bion M. Gregory, Legislative Counsel, to Honorable John R. Garamendi, at 1, 3 (emphasis added). The Agency introduced no testimony or documentary evidence to rebut these two documents.

(i) **Drugs Marketed Intra-State**

The Food and Drug Act does not regulate drugs which are manufactured and distributed wholly within one state. 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(b), 331. The states have acted to regulate the manufacture, shipment and sale of drugs wholly within a single state. See, e.g., Calif. Health and Safety Code §§ 26670(b)-26676; N.Y. Educ. Law, Art. 137, § 6817(b)-(c) (McKinney 1985). Drugs which are legally manufactured within a particular state, available to physicians within that state and administered by physicians within that state obviously can constitute accepted medical use in treatment in the United States.
(ii) Orphan Drugs and Treatment INDs

There is a group of so-called orphan drugs which have been recognized by the Congress as being drugs which have medical utility and accepted medical use in treatment, but where financial rewards are not sufficiently great to motivate a pharmaceutical company to pursue the FDA approval process. Historically, in these situations, these drugs have been made routinely available to physicians as so-called "compassionate INDs" or "treatment INDs" for the treatment of patients suffering from a rare disease when the drug of choice for treating the disease has not been approved for marketing. In recommending that the House of Representatives approve the Orphan Drug Act which was enacted into law in 1983, the House Commerce Committee made the following observations:

For a variety of reasons, the most prominent being the lack of financial return, many orphan drugs never have their human clinical tests completed and a new drug application for approval submitted to FDA. For those orphan drugs for which tests are completed, the period of testing is often substantially longer than for drugs for common diseases.

During the testing period, drugs for a rare disease, as are other drugs, are often placed in what is commonly called "compassionate IND status." (IND status stands for investigational new drug and is the period during which human clinical trials are conducted.) In this status, the sponsoring company will make the drug available, with FDA's approval, to individuals who are not a part of the research plan for the drug but who need the drug for treatment of the disease or disorder for which the drug is being tested. The sponsor can do this with FDA approval, under current FDA procedures, either at its own request or, on the sponsor's discretion, at the request of an individual physician who wants the drug for a patient.
The compassionate IND mechanism is particularly important for orphan drugs. Often there aren't alternative therapies to the drug being tested; and the testing period is lengthy. In some cases, clinical trials are not actively being conducted.

The survey of the Subcommittee on Health and the Environment found that since 1970 pharmaceutical companies have had 24 drugs for rare diseases in "compassionate IND status." The survey results show that the average time for human clinical testing for 20 of the 24 compassionate IND drugs was 8.5 years, as compared with 5.1 years for the 47 orphan drugs which have been approved and marketed since 1970. In fact, one drug was in compassionate IND status for 19 years. Even at 5.1 years, the period of testing is significantly longer than that for drugs for common diseases.

It is the Committee's understanding that the request for compassionate IND status for most orphan drugs have been from individual physicians. The materials required to be submitted by those physicians are often voluminous and usually held by the sponsoring company. The Committee believes this is not only inefficient, but also fails to attain the broadest possible distribution of orphan drugs to afflicted individuals.

To make this system more efficient, the Committee's bill would require FDA to encourage the sponsor of a designated drug to assume responsibility for adding to the tests individuals who need the drug for treatment. Under this procedure, often called "open protocols," a physician would make a request for the drug directly to the sponsor and the sponsor would have FDA's prior approval to add new individuals at the sponsor's discretion. The sponsor and the physician would, as under current procedures, have to collect all clinical data requested by FDA.

The Committee's bill, in section 526, requires FDA to notify the public of the designation of a drug for a rare disease or condition. One reason for this notice is to advise the appropriate health professionals and voluntary disease organizations of the testing which will begin or is being conducted on the drug. This notice, plus the broader and more efficient distribution possible through open protocols, will increase the availability of orphan drugs during the lengthy testing period.

Shortly after the Congress passed the Orphan Drug Act in early 1983, the Food and Drug Administration published a proposed rule in the Federal Register which explicitly recognized the fact that drugs which are in the "investigational" phase are used for "treatment" in many, many circumstances. The regulations which FDA proposed in June, 1983, would expand existing practice in accordance with the statutory directives in the Orphan Drug Act. FDA wrote as follows:

This Section codifies a special procedure authorizing the "treatment use" of investigational drugs in an investigational context.

When reports in the medical literature begin to appear that a new investigational drug shows promise for a serious disease, a demand for the drug for the benefit of patients frequently develops. FDA has responded to this demand by permitting physicians to obtain investigational drugs for treatment use either under physician-sponsored IND's or under protocols that are part of commercially sponsored IND's. . . .

Although the Agency has for many years permitted selected investigational drugs to be distributed primarily for treatment use under these circumstances, the current IND regulations do not specifically authorize the practice. The proposed revisions would expressly authorize this use of investigational drugs. . . .

FDA has been criticized for not adequately informing the medical community about the availability of certain
investigational drugs for treatment use. The proposal is intended to improve physician (and patient) access to these investigational drugs. . . .

For some of the most promising investigational drugs, requests for the drug for treatment of individual patients can extend into the hundreds. The regulation would encourage drug companies to accommodate such requests. . . .


No one can deny that orphan drugs and drugs with "treatment" INDs have an "accepted medical use in treatment in the United States." But these drugs do not have an NDA approved by the FDA. Plainly, the interpretation of the CSA urged by agency counsel is inconsistent not only with the plain meaning of the statutory language, not only with the CSA's legislative history, not only with the long standing interpretation of the FDCA that the FDA does not regulate medical practice, not only with the recognition under the FDCA that states can approve drugs for intrastate marketing, but it is also inconsistent with the recognition that many drugs become accepted as treatment by the medical community long before an NDA is finally approved.

(iii) HHS Secretary Bowen

In this connection, it is instructive to note the experience of the new Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, Dr. Otis Bowen. In a 1981 speech to an American Medical Association meeting, Secretary Bowen stated that he had administered to his wife, who was at the time dying of cancer, DMSO and "another helpful medication I had
to get from France"\(^{11}\) because it was not approved for marketing in the United States by the FDA. Speaking of the DMSO, Dr. Bowen told his AMA audience, "Why can't a dying person with severe pain have easy prescription access to it? . . . The container said 'for horses only'.\(^{12}\) In short, the Secretary administered to his wife both a veterinary preparation as well as an unapproved drug which he obtained from a foreign country.

What the Secretary did was not a violation of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. And the reason it was not is that the Act does not regulate the practice of medicine. If a doctor obtains a veterinary drug, or a chemical from a chemical supply house, or an herb from nature and administers it to his or her patient, the simple fact is that the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act does not govern either the propriety or the "accepted" or "nonaccepted" nature of that medical practice.

The Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act licenses commercial companies to market products about which therapeutic claims are made. If a physician were to sell or to market outside of his own practice a drug which was not approved by the FDA, then and only then would the physician come under the jurisdiction of either the relevant State or

\(^{11}\) American Medical News, Nov. 22/29, 1985, p. 37.

\(^{12}\) N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1985, at B6.
Federal Food and Drug Act. But, as long as the physician is practicing medicine within his or her practice, it is exclusively the views of the relevant medical community that determine whether or not that physician is practicing "accepted" medicine. From a legal point of view it is exclusively the laws of the state in which the physician is practicing and the law of medical malpractice that determine whether the physician is engaging in "accepted medical practice", or in the case of a drug, whether a drug has "accepted medical use in treatment."

4. The Case Law Has Consistently Determined that the FDA Does Not Regulate Medical Practice

As the court in United States v. Evers, 453 F. Supp. 1141 (M.D. Ala. 1978), aff'd, 643 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1981), observed:

Congress did not intend the Food and Drug Administration to interfere with medical practice as between the physician and the patient. Congress recognized the patient's right to seek civil damages in the courts if there should be evidence of malpractice and declined to provide any legislative restrictions upon the medical profession. . . . Congressional intent set out in 37 Fed. Reg. 16503 (1972) indicates the Congress did not intend the Food and Drug Administration to interfere with medical practice and that the bill did not purport to regulate the practice of medicine as between the physician and the patient.
453 F. Supp. at 1149. The Court in *United States v. Evers* also points out:

"... the physician can ascertain from medical literature and from medical meetings new and interesting proposed uses for drugs marketed under package inserts not including the new proposed usages... New uses for drugs are often discovered, reported in medical journals and at medical meetings, and subsequently may be widely used by the medical profession... The manufacturer may not have sufficient commercial interests or financial wherewithal to warrant following the necessary procedures to obtain FDA approval for the additional use of the drug. When physicians go beyond the directions given in the package insert it does not mean they are acting illegally or unethically, and Congress does not intend to empower the FDA to interfere with medical practice by limiting the ability of physicians to prescribe according to their best judgment."


The observations of one state court in invalidating an effort under State law to prosecute a doctor for prescribing an unapproved drug are extremely pertinent:

To require prior state approval before advising -- prescribing -- administering -- a new treatment modality for an informed consenting patient is to suppress innovation by the person best qualified to make medical progress. The treating doctor, the clinician, is at the cutting edge of medical knowledge.

To require the doctor to use only orthodox 'state sanctioned' methods of treatment under threat of criminal penalty for variance is to invite a repetition in California of the Soviet experience with Lysenkoism. The mention of a requirement that licensed doctors must prescribe, treat 'within state sanctioned alternatives' raises the specter
of medical stagnation at the best, statism, paternalistic big brother at worst. It is by the alternatives to orthodoxy that medical progress has been made. A free, progressive society has an enormous stake in recognizing and protecting this right of the physician.


5. Accepted medical use must be determined on the basis of evidence from the relevant medical community.

"Accepted medical use" means accepted by the medical community. In medical malpractice cases, the courts have recognized that different physicians within the medical community may have different but equally "acceptable" views with respect to particular medical practices. In determining what constitutes "accepted" medical practice, the courts have evolved a test that a method of treatment is acceptable when it is supported by reputable, respectable, medical experts. See, e.g., Baldor v. Rogers, 81 So.2d 658 (Fla. 1955); Young v. United States, 574 F. Supp. 571 (D. Del. 1983); Furey v. Thomas Jefferson University Hosp., 472 A.2d 1083 (Pa. Super. 1984).

One of the leading treatises in the field of medical malpractice has stated the test as follows:

... it appears well settled that if a physician pursues a course followed by a 'respectable minority' of the profession or an established school of thought, he is within the boundaries of permissible conduct. Again, mere differences of methods do not imply deviation from the standard of care if it appears that each method can reasonably be regarded as acceptable.
... But whether the minority's practice is truly 'respectable' or 'reputable' is of course a proper subject for expert evidence. The 'respectable minority' doctrine does not mean that any quack, charlatan or crackpot can set himself up as a 'school' and so apply his individual ideas without liability."

Prosser, Law of Torts, § 166 (3d ed.).

D. Louisell & H. Williams, Medical Malpractice, ¶ 8.04, at 8.57, 8.56n (1985 ed.). This test is well established in the law, and it is the appropriate test under the CSA.

In sum, it is our position that the phrase "accepted medical use in treatment in the United States" means that the use of a particular drug is accepted by reputable physicians. Those physicians need not constitute the majority, but they must be reputable physicians who constitute at least a respectable minority of practitioners within the medical community.
D. Restrictions That Would Apply to MDMA Schedule III

Because MDMA has not been approved for interstate shipment and sale by the Food and Drug Administration, the dual effects of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act and the Controlled Substances Act would impose severe restrictions on MDMA's availability if it were placed in Schedule III. First, no one could manufacture MDMA legally without approval from the Drug Enforcement Administration. Second, no researcher of any kind could obtain MDMA from another source without obtaining an IND from the Food and Drug Administration. To obtain an IND would require FDA review and approval of the research protocol. Third, if MDMA were placed in Schedule III, a physician could not legally manufacture MDMA for use in his or her own practice. The physician would have to seek approval from the DEA to manufacture it, even if the physician sought to manufacture MDMA exclusively for use in her or his own practice. Specifically, a physician would have to register with DEA to conduct research on MDMA as a Schedule III substance. Then, as part of his or her application for registration with the DEA, the physician would have to seek the permission of the DEA to manufacture the amount of MDMA needed for the research. 21 C.F.R. § 1301.22(b)(5).
There is no obligation on the part of the DEA to approve the manufacture of MDMA under such circumstances. If the DEA refused to approve such manufacture, then the physician would have to obtain MDMA from another source. To do so the physician would have to obtain an IND, in order to allow the drug to be shipped to him. If the DEA did approve the manufacture of the drug as part of a physician's research protocol, the DEA could condition its approval of an individual researcher's right to manufacture MDMA on the researcher/physician obtaining an IND from the Food and Drug Administration to cover the research.